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gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files #149994

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gh-146581: Update docs for dangerous filenames in ZIP files #149994

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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion Doc/library/shutil.rst
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Expand Up @@ -750,7 +750,7 @@ provided. They rely on the :mod:`zipfile` and :mod:`tarfile` modules.
Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
It is possible that files are created outside of the path specified in
the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames
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@StanFromIreland StanFromIreland May 18, 2026

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the *extract_dir* argument, e.g. members that have absolute filenames
the *extract_dir* argument, for example, members that have absolute filenames

Can we fix this while we're here please. We should not have latin abbreviations.

starting with "/" or filenames with two dots "..".
or filenames with ".." components.

Since Python 3.14, the defaults for both built-in formats (zip and tar
files) will prevent the most dangerous of such security issues,
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6 changes: 3 additions & 3 deletions Doc/library/zipfile.rst
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Expand Up @@ -412,8 +412,8 @@ ZipFile objects

Never extract archives from untrusted sources without prior inspection.
It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members
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@StanFromIreland StanFromIreland May 18, 2026

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It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, e.g. members
It is possible that files are created outside of *path*, for example, members

that have absolute filenames starting with ``"/"`` or filenames with two
dots ``".."``. This module attempts to prevent that.
that have absolute filenames or filenames with ".." components.
This module attempts to prevent that.
See :meth:`extract` note.

.. versionchanged:: 3.6
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ Path objects
The :class:`Path` class does not sanitize filenames within the ZIP archive. Unlike
the :meth:`ZipFile.extract` and :meth:`ZipFile.extractall` methods, it is the
caller's responsibility to validate or sanitize filenames to prevent path traversal
vulnerabilities (e.g., filenames containing ".." or absolute paths). When handling
vulnerabilities (e.g., absolute paths or paths with ".." cmponents). When handling
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@StanFromIreland StanFromIreland May 18, 2026

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vulnerabilities (e.g., absolute paths or paths with ".." cmponents). When handling
vulnerabilities (for example, absolute paths or paths with ".." components). When handling

Latin abbreviation here too, and a typo.

untrusted archives, consider resolving filenames using :func:`os.path.abspath`
and checking against the target directory with :func:`os.path.commonpath`.

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