fix(api): conceal cross-tenant resource denials on internal routes by waleedlatif1 · Pull Request #6586 · simstudioai/sim

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-12T02:34:39Z

Summary

createV2ResourceConcealmentPolicy rewrites DelegatedWorkspaceAuthorizationError, NoWorkspaceAccessError, and WorkspaceApiKeyScopeAuthorizationError to a 404 on v2 single-resource routes. The internal routes reach the same application use cases and still answered 403, so the existence probe the v2 policy closes still worked from the other surface.
Added createInternalResourceConcealmentPolicy (and concealCrossTenantResourceError for the raw withRouteHandler routes) beside the v2 factory, and renamed v2-resource-concealment.ts → resource-concealment.ts since it now owns both surfaces. The concealed failure is re-projected through each domain's existing base policy as a not_found orchestration error, so every body shape (success: false, the legacy workflow code field, the table 423 lock branch) is exactly what that route's real 404 already returns.
Same-workspace denials are untouched: InsufficientWorkspacePermissionsError, PersonalApiKeysDisabledError, WorkspaceApiKeyAuthorizationError, and PrincipalKindAuthorizationError all stay 403 on both surfaces, and generic OrchestrationError('forbidden', …) is never classified by message.

Routes whose status changed (cross-tenant denial only: `403` → `404`)

Route	Concealed as
`GET`/`PUT`/`DELETE /api/workflows/[id]`	Workflow not found
`GET`/`POST`/`PATCH`/`DELETE /api/workflows/[id]/deploy`	Workflow not found
`GET /api/workflows/[id]/deployments`	Workflow not found
`GET`/`PATCH /api/workflows/[id]/deployments/[version]`	Workflow not found
`PATCH`/`DELETE /api/workspaces/[id]/files/[fileId]`	File not found
`PUT /api/workspaces/[id]/files/[fileId]/content`	File not found
`GET`/`PUT /api/workspaces/[id]/files/[fileId]/share`	File not found
`POST /api/table/imports`, `POST /api/table/[tableId]/exports`	Table not found
`POST`/`PATCH`/`DELETE /api/table/[tableId]/groups`	Table not found
`GET`/`DELETE /api/table/imports/[importId]`, `POST .../parts`, `POST .../complete`	Table import not found
`GET`/`DELETE /api/table/exports/[exportId]`, `GET .../download`	Table export not found
`/api/knowledge/[id]/**` (read/update/delete/restore, documents, chunks, tags, connectors, uploads, upsert) and `POST /api/knowledge/search`	Knowledge base not found

Deliberately left at 403

Workspace-level list/create — GET/POST /api/knowledge name no resource, so a 403 there betrays nothing. Concealing them would turn a denied workspace into a phantom empty list.
/api/mcp/**, /api/skills/**, /api/tools/custom, /api/logs/[id], workflow runs/execute/resume — the v2 routes for these use v2-only use cases with no internal counterpart sharing the symbol, so there is no asymmetry to close. Several of them are also where a flip would regress: hooks/queries/mcp.ts:92,127 and hooks/queries/workflow-mcp-servers.ts:60,130 swallow 404 into [], so a denied user would see a "no servers configured" empty state instead of an error, and deploy-modal/components/mcp/mcp.tsx:400 auto-recreates a tool on 404.
GET /api/workspaces/[id]/host-context — untouched. workspace-host-provider.tsx:29 is the one surface that renders a dedicated <WorkspaceAccessDenied /> on 403; flipping it would drop a revoked user into a stale workspace tree.

UI impact of what did change

I swept hooks/** and app/** for 403/404 branching on the affected families. Nothing structural flips:

knowledge/[id]/base.tsx:1233 already renders "Knowledge base not found" for both statuses.
kb/knowledge.ts:113 rewrites 404 to "Document not found" — message-only change, same error layout.
tables/[tableId]/error.tsx copy already hedges "deleted or you may not have permission".
Table and custom-tool toasts render error.message verbatim, so a denied write now reads "Table not found" instead of "Insufficient workspace permissions".
logs.ts:208 skips retry on 404 — one fewer retry before the same error state.

Type of Change

Bug fix

Testing

bun run type-check, bunx vitest run app/api lib/api (342 files / 3257 tests), bun run lint, bun run check:api-validation — all green.

Tests pin the concealed status per policy and per route: resource-concealment.test.ts now covers every internal policy alongside the v2 ones, and route-level tests drive the real handlers for file rename/share/content, workflow PUT, and deployment-version PATCH. Table/group route tests assert the wiring. Verified they can fail — stubbing concealCrossTenantResourceError to a passthrough turns 60 tests red, and un-wiring a single table route fails its wiring assertion with expected { kind: 'plain' } to be { kind: 'conceal-import' }.

Checklist

Code follows project style guidelines
Self-reviewed my changes
Tests added/updated and passing
No new warnings introduced
I confirm that I have read and agree to the terms outlined in the Contributor License Agreement (CLA)

vercel · 2026-08-12T02:34:47Z

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1 Skipped Deployment

Project	Deployment	Actions	Updated (UTC)
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cursor · 2026-08-12T02:34:50Z

PR Summary

High Risk
Changes authorization error semantics across many internal API surfaces (workflows, tables, files, knowledge). This is security-hardening, but incorrect classification could leak existence signals or turn legitimate 403s into 404s.

Overview
Closes a cross-surface existence probe: internal single-resource routes previously returned 403 for cross-tenant denials while their v2 twins already returned 404.

Adds createInternalResourceConcealmentPolicy and concealCrossTenantResourceError beside the existing v2 factory (renamed into resource-concealment.ts), then wires them through workflow, table, file, and knowledge-base internal error policies. Cross-tenant failures (NoWorkspaceAccessError, WorkspaceApiKeyScopeAuthorizationError, DelegatedWorkspaceAuthorizationError) now project as domain-specific not-found responses; same-workspace role/key denials stay 403.

Workspace-level list/create and a few intentionally asymmetric surfaces are left unchanged.

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit c96b6b0. Configure here.}

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-12T02:37:58Z

@greptile

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-12T02:37:59Z

@cursor review

greptile-apps · 2026-08-12T02:39:55Z

Greptile Summary

The PR extends the existing cross-tenant resource-concealment behavior from v2 endpoints to corresponding internal workflow, file, table, and knowledge routes.

Adds shared internal and raw-handler concealment helpers while preserving each route family’s existing error response shape.
Wires single-resource internal routes to domain-specific concealment policies while leaving workspace-level list/create operations unchanged.
Adds policy, route-level, and wiring tests covering concealed cross-tenant denials and unchanged same-workspace permission denials.

Confidence Score: 5/5

The PR appears safe to merge.

No blocking failure remains.

Important Files Changed

Filename	Overview
apps/sim/lib/api/server/routes/resource-concealment.ts	Introduces shared internal and raw-handler concealment while preserving the existing v2 classification behavior.
apps/sim/lib/workflows/api/route-policies.ts	Applies workflow-not-found concealment to internal single-workflow policies without changing same-workspace denials.
apps/sim/lib/knowledge/api/route-policies.ts	Conceals knowledge-base-scoped operations while deliberately retaining existing behavior for workspace-level list and create policies.
apps/sim/lib/table/api/route-policies.ts	Adds internal table, group, import, and export concealment policies while retaining the table-lock response branch.
apps/sim/lib/workspace-files/api/internal-error-policies.ts	Adds concealment variants for single-file and content operations while preserving specialized file errors.
apps/sim/app/api/workflows/[id]/route.ts	Wires declarative and raw workflow handlers through the new concealment behavior.
apps/sim/app/api/workflows/[id]/deployments/[version]/route.ts	Conceals cross-tenant failures in the raw deployment-version mutation before existing error classification.
apps/sim/app/api/table/table-transfer-routes.test.ts	Verifies all internal table-transfer routes select the appropriate resource-specific concealment policy.
apps/sim/lib/api/server/routes/resource-concealment.test.ts	Covers internal and v2 concealment, preserved same-workspace denials, specialized policy branches, and unconcealed list/create behavior.

Flowchart

%%{init: {'theme': 'neutral'}}%%
flowchart LR
  Request[Internal or v2 resource request] --> UseCase[Authorized application use case]
  UseCase --> Result{Outcome}
  Result -->|Allowed| Success[Existing success response]
  Result -->|Cross-tenant denial| Conceal[Resource concealment policy]
  Conceal --> NotFound[Domain-specific 404 response]
  Result -->|Same-workspace denial| Forbidden[Existing 403 response]
  Result -->|Other domain error| BasePolicy[Existing domain error policy]
  BasePolicy --> ExistingShape[Existing route-specific error response]

_{Reviews (3): Last reviewed commit: "fix(api): conceal cross-tenant resource ..." | Re-trigger Greptile}

The v2 routes rewrite DelegatedWorkspaceAuthorizationError, NoWorkspaceAccessError, and WorkspaceApiKeyScopeAuthorizationError to a 404 so a caller with no reach into a workspace cannot confirm a resource exists. The internal routes reach the same application use cases and still answered 403, so the same probe worked from the other surface. Same-workspace role denials stay 403 on both.

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-12T02:40:43Z

@greptile

waleedlatif1 · 2026-08-12T02:40:44Z

@cursor review

cursor

✅ Bugbot reviewed your changes and found no new issues!

Comment @cursor review or bugbot run to trigger another review on this PR

^{Reviewed by Cursor Bugbot for commit c96b6b0. Configure here.}

waleedlatif1 force-pushed the fix/concealment-parity branch from f67ef7f to aa0bba5 Compare August 12, 2026 02:37

vercel Bot temporarily deployed to Preview August 12, 2026 02:37 Inactive

waleedlatif1 force-pushed the fix/concealment-parity branch from aa0bba5 to c96b6b0 Compare August 12, 2026 02:40

vercel Bot temporarily deployed to Preview August 12, 2026 02:40 Inactive

cursor Bot reviewed Aug 12, 2026

View reviewed changes

waleedlatif1 merged commit 083319b into staging Aug 12, 2026
30 checks passed

waleedlatif1 deleted the fix/concealment-parity branch August 12, 2026 02:50

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fix(api): conceal cross-tenant resource denials on internal routes - #6586

fix(api): conceal cross-tenant resource denials on internal routes#6586
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fix/concealment-parity

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waleedlatif1 commented Aug 12, 2026

Summary

Routes whose status changed (cross-tenant denial only: 403 → 404)

Deliberately left at 403

UI impact of what did change

Type of Change

Testing

Checklist

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PR Summary

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Greptile Summary

Confidence Score: 5/5

Important Files Changed

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Routes whose status changed (cross-tenant denial only: `403` → `404`)

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