Bug report
Bug description:
concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor cannot be constructed on macOS under
any sandbox profile that denies sysctl reads, even though every primitive it
depends on is fully functional in that environment.
_check_system_limits() in Lib/concurrent/futures/process.py reads the
semaphore limit like this:
try:
nsems_max = os.sysconf("SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX")
except (AttributeError, ValueError):
# sysconf not available or setting not available
return
The handler catches AttributeError and ValueError. It does not catch
OSError. On macOS, SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX is backed by a sysctl, so a sandbox that
denies sysctl reads makes this call raise PermissionError (an OSError
subclass). The exception propagates out of ProcessPoolExecutor.__init__ before
any worker is created.
The inconsistency is with the function's own stated intent. The existing
except clause already treats "the limit cannot be determined" as benign and
returns — as does the nsems_max == -1 branch immediately below, commented
"indetermined limit, assume that limit is determined by available memory only".
A denied read is the same condition as an unavailable one, arriving as a
different exception type, but it is handled as a fatal error instead.
The practical result is that ProcessPoolExecutor becomes unavailable while
multiprocessing.Pool — same platform, same named semaphores, same spawn
machinery — works correctly. multiprocessing.Pool differs only in that it
never calls _check_system_limits.
This is a robustness bug, not a security issue. The sandbox behaves correctly by
denying the sysctl; the reproduction below denies it explicitly.
Reproduction
repro.py (attached) is standalone, has no third-party dependencies, and does
no monkeypatching. deny_sysctl.sb is a minimal profile that allows everything
except sysctl reads, so the outcome cannot be attributed to any other
restriction:
(version 1)
(allow default)
(deny sysctl-read)
$ python3 repro.py # baseline
$ sandbox-exec -f deny_sysctl.sb python3 repro.py # one capability denied
Actual behaviour
Under (deny sysctl-read) on macOS 26.5.2 (Darwin 25.5.0), CPython 3.13.12:
introspection (queries about a capability)
os.sysconf(SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX) FAIL PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted (errno=1)
_check_system_limits() FAIL PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted (errno=1)
direct (exercises the capability)
multiprocessing.Semaphore OK acquire/release
multiprocessing.Process(spawn) OK spawn/join exit=0
multiprocessing.Pool(spawn) OK [1, 4, 9, 16]
concurrent.futures.ProcessPool FAIL PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted (errno=1)
Traceback:
File "concurrent/futures/process.py", line ..., in __init__
_check_system_limits()
File "concurrent/futures/process.py", line ..., in _check_system_limits
nsems_max = os.sysconf("SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX")
PermissionError: [Errno 1] Operation not permitted
Baseline run with no sandbox: all six checks pass.
Expected behaviour
ProcessPoolExecutor should construct and run. An unreadable semaphore limit is
already treated as benign when the read fails for other reasons; a denied read
should be treated the same way.
Suggested fix
Add OSError to the caught exceptions:
try:
nsems_max = os.sysconf("SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAX")
except (AttributeError, ValueError, OSError):
# sysconf not available, setting not available, or the read was denied
# (e.g. a sandbox profile that denies sysctl reads on macOS)
return
This preserves the genuine "too few semaphores" check, which raises
NotImplementedError with an explanatory message and is unaffected. It only
extends the existing "limit cannot be determined" path to cover denial.
If the narrower change is preferred, catching PermissionError alone fixes the
observed case, though any denied sysconf read raises some OSError and the
broader catch matches the comment's intent.
A regression test could patch os.sysconf to raise PermissionError and assert
that ProcessPoolExecutor still constructs — no sandbox required in CI.
Environment
- macOS 26.5.2 (Darwin 25.5.0), arm64
Verified on three interpreters on the same host, all with identical results —
sysconf denied, ProcessPoolExecutor unconstructible, multiprocessing.Pool
working:
| Interpreter |
Result |
CPython 3.9.6 (/usr/bin/python3, Apple system Python) |
reproduces |
| CPython 3.12.13 |
reproduces |
| CPython 3.13.12 (python.org framework build) |
reproduces |
The handler predates all three, so this is longstanding rather than a
regression. Note that the version shipped with macOS is affected.
CPython versions tested on:
3.12, 3.13
Operating systems tested on:
macOS
Linked PRs
Bug report
Bug description:
concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutorcannot be constructed on macOS underany sandbox profile that denies sysctl reads, even though every primitive it
depends on is fully functional in that environment.
_check_system_limits()inLib/concurrent/futures/process.pyreads thesemaphore limit like this:
The handler catches
AttributeErrorandValueError. It does not catchOSError. On macOS,SC_SEM_NSEMS_MAXis backed by a sysctl, so a sandbox thatdenies sysctl reads makes this call raise
PermissionError(anOSErrorsubclass). The exception propagates out of
ProcessPoolExecutor.__init__beforeany worker is created.
The inconsistency is with the function's own stated intent. The existing
exceptclause already treats "the limit cannot be determined" as benign andreturns — as does the
nsems_max == -1branch immediately below, commented"indetermined limit, assume that limit is determined by available memory only".
A denied read is the same condition as an unavailable one, arriving as a
different exception type, but it is handled as a fatal error instead.
The practical result is that
ProcessPoolExecutorbecomes unavailable whilemultiprocessing.Pool— same platform, same named semaphores, same spawnmachinery — works correctly.
multiprocessing.Pooldiffers only in that itnever calls
_check_system_limits.This is a robustness bug, not a security issue. The sandbox behaves correctly by
denying the sysctl; the reproduction below denies it explicitly.
Reproduction
repro.py(attached) is standalone, has no third-party dependencies, and doesno monkeypatching.
deny_sysctl.sbis a minimal profile that allows everythingexcept sysctl reads, so the outcome cannot be attributed to any other
restriction:
Actual behaviour
Under
(deny sysctl-read)on macOS 26.5.2 (Darwin 25.5.0), CPython 3.13.12:Traceback:
Baseline run with no sandbox: all six checks pass.
Expected behaviour
ProcessPoolExecutorshould construct and run. An unreadable semaphore limit isalready treated as benign when the read fails for other reasons; a denied read
should be treated the same way.
Suggested fix
Add
OSErrorto the caught exceptions:This preserves the genuine "too few semaphores" check, which raises
NotImplementedErrorwith an explanatory message and is unaffected. It onlyextends the existing "limit cannot be determined" path to cover denial.
If the narrower change is preferred, catching
PermissionErroralone fixes theobserved case, though any denied
sysconfread raises someOSErrorand thebroader catch matches the comment's intent.
A regression test could patch
os.sysconfto raisePermissionErrorand assertthat
ProcessPoolExecutorstill constructs — no sandbox required in CI.Environment
Verified on three interpreters on the same host, all with identical results —
sysconfdenied,ProcessPoolExecutorunconstructible,multiprocessing.Poolworking:
/usr/bin/python3, Apple system Python)The handler predates all three, so this is longstanding rather than a
regression. Note that the version shipped with macOS is affected.
CPython versions tested on:
3.12, 3.13
Operating systems tested on:
macOS
Linked PRs