tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption#64677
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tls: fix authorized state on no-cert TLS1.3 client cert resumption#64677pimterry wants to merge 1 commit into
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Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert, but the client didn't send one, and you used rejectUnauthorized:false the resumed session would report authorized=true. This doesn't match TLS 1.2 behaviour or make any sense, and was purely an artifact of our internal logic for handling TLS 1.3 resumption details. We now correctly report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection in all cases, with a matrix test that fully checks the invariant: authorized state after resume should always match the initial state. Signed-off-by: Tim Perry <pimterry@gmail.com>
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Boringssl is an actual failure here... Seems TLS resumption works quite differently over there and so the tests stall. I'll dig into it tomorrow. |
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## main #64677 +/- ##
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- Coverage 90.15% 90.13% -0.02%
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Files 741 741
Lines 242207 242120 -87
Branches 45606 45604 -2
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- Hits 218354 218239 -115
- Misses 15350 15376 +26
- Partials 8503 8505 +2
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Previously if you used TLS 1.3 and the server requested a client cert, but the client didn't send one, and you used
rejectUnauthorized: false(e.g. to manually verify state with some extra conditions) then the initial session would reportauthorized=false, but resuming the session later would reportauthorized=true.This doesn't match TLS 1.2 behaviour (which correctly preserves authorization state & errors across resumption). It's not inevitable and it wasn't intentional - this is an artifact of our internal logic for handling PSKs in TLS 1.3 inside ncrypto (here) that wasn't properly validated on this side.
We now correctly report the authorization state and/or error from the original connection in all cases. This also adds a matrix test that fully checks the invariant over all combinations of TLS 1.2/1.3 + valid-cert/invalid-cert/no-cert: authorized state after resume should always match the initial state.
Fixes #35317 - note there is some debate in there (cc @bnoordhuis) but I think there's confusion in some of the descriptions and it's actually just a clear bug.
See also #64584 which was opened just now, to simply document the current state.
This PR is either a fix for the current state (in which case we could close #64584) or a semver-major change (in which case we can keep the document PR for now, and merge this to clean that up to change the behaviour as a major bump). Opinions from @nodejs/crypto would be helpful. This is arguably a security fix but it has been directly described in public in that issue as intended behaviour for nearly 6 years.
The scope is limited to
rejectUnauthorized: falsecases, which does imply a degree of taking your own responsibility for validation - but even if you enable that option we still shouldn't lie to you unnecessarily, as we do today.