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Malicious ZIP archives can contain entries with paths like ../../file that escape the target directory. Validate that every resolved destination path stays within the target directory before extracting. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Validate extracted paths stay within target directory using realpath - Hoist real_target computation above the extraction loop - Add same protection to instance_controller.py archive extraction - Add tests for traversal, absolute path, and legitimate entries Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Summary
os.path.realpath()during ZIP extractionreal_targetcomputation above the extraction loop for performance and correctnessinstance_controller.pyarchive extraction (backup restore flow)Security Impact
Severity: Critical — Users can download mod ZIPs from arbitrary URLs. A malicious ZIP with entries like
../../../.bashrccould write files outside the mods directory.Test plan
tests/utils/test_zip_extractor.py— 3 tests passing🤖 Generated with Claude Code