TICKET: WCN-196

Problem

EdDSA TSS signing paths have no recipient verification before signing:

• eddsa.ts (MPC v1): No verifyTransaction call at all. After resolving the
  unsigned tx, the code proceeds directly to MPC signing rounds with zero verification
  that the transaction recipients match the intent.

• eddsaMPCv2.ts (MPC v2): Has a verifyTransaction call but uses
  params.txParams || { recipients: [] }, which always falls back to an empty
  recipients array — making the recipient check in verifyTransaction a no-op.

This means an attacker who can manipulate the txPrebuild (the actual transaction bytes)
can substitute different recipient addresses without detection on any EdDSA coin
(SOL, ADA, SUI, TON, DOT, APT, NEAR, CANTON, IOTA, TAO).

This is the EdDSA counterpart to the ECDSA fix in #8924.

Fix

• eddsa.ts: Add verifyTransaction call with resolveEffectiveTxParams to resolve
  recipients from txRequest.intent (server-side truth) and verify them against the
  txPrebuild before signing.

• eddsaMPCv2.ts: Replace params.txParams || { recipients: [] } with
  resolveEffectiveTxParams(txRequest, params.txParams) so the existing
  verifyTransaction call receives actual recipients for comparison.

• recipientUtils.ts: Add EdDSA-specific no-recipient transaction types to
  NO_RECIPIENT_TX_TYPES: closeAssociatedTokenAccount (SOL),
  voteDelegation (ADA), transferAcknowledge (CANTON).

Verification

• Checked EdDSA intent types verified against production logs entries
• recipientUtils unit tests passing (12/12).