| 1 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only |
| 2 | /* |
| 3 | * fs/crypto/hooks.c |
| 4 | * |
| 5 | * Encryption hooks for higher-level filesystem operations. |
| 6 | */ |
| 7 | |
| 8 | #include <linux/export.h> |
| 9 | |
| 10 | #include "fscrypt_private.h" |
| 11 | |
| 12 | /** |
| 13 | * fscrypt_file_open() - prepare to open a possibly-encrypted regular file |
| 14 | * @inode: the inode being opened |
| 15 | * @filp: the struct file being set up |
| 16 | * |
| 17 | * Currently, an encrypted regular file can only be opened if its encryption key |
| 18 | * is available; access to the raw encrypted contents is not supported. |
| 19 | * Therefore, we first set up the inode's encryption key (if not already done) |
| 20 | * and return an error if it's unavailable. |
| 21 | * |
| 22 | * We also verify that if the parent directory (from the path via which the file |
| 23 | * is being opened) is encrypted, then the inode being opened uses the same |
| 24 | * encryption policy. This is needed as part of the enforcement that all files |
| 25 | * in an encrypted directory tree use the same encryption policy, as a |
| 26 | * protection against certain types of offline attacks. Note that this check is |
| 27 | * needed even when opening an *unencrypted* file, since it's forbidden to have |
| 28 | * an unencrypted file in an encrypted directory. |
| 29 | * |
| 30 | * Return: 0 on success, -ENOKEY if the key is missing, or another -errno code |
| 31 | */ |
| 32 | int fscrypt_file_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) |
| 33 | { |
| 34 | int err; |
| 35 | struct dentry *dentry, *dentry_parent; |
| 36 | struct inode *inode_parent; |
| 37 | |
| 38 | err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); |
| 39 | if (err) |
| 40 | return err; |
| 41 | |
| 42 | dentry = file_dentry(file: filp); |
| 43 | |
| 44 | /* |
| 45 | * Getting a reference to the parent dentry is needed for the actual |
| 46 | * encryption policy comparison, but it's expensive on multi-core |
| 47 | * systems. Since this function runs on unencrypted files too, start |
| 48 | * with a lightweight RCU-mode check for the parent directory being |
| 49 | * unencrypted (in which case it's fine for the child to be either |
| 50 | * unencrypted, or encrypted with any policy). Only continue on to the |
| 51 | * full policy check if the parent directory is actually encrypted. |
| 52 | */ |
| 53 | rcu_read_lock(); |
| 54 | dentry_parent = READ_ONCE(dentry->d_parent); |
| 55 | inode_parent = d_inode_rcu(dentry: dentry_parent); |
| 56 | if (inode_parent != NULL && !IS_ENCRYPTED(inode_parent)) { |
| 57 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 58 | return 0; |
| 59 | } |
| 60 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
| 61 | |
| 62 | dentry_parent = dget_parent(dentry); |
| 63 | if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(parent: d_inode(dentry: dentry_parent), child: inode)) { |
| 64 | fscrypt_warn(inode, |
| 65 | "Inconsistent encryption context (parent directory: %lu)" , |
| 66 | d_inode(dentry_parent)->i_ino); |
| 67 | err = -EPERM; |
| 68 | } |
| 69 | dput(dentry_parent); |
| 70 | return err; |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_file_open); |
| 73 | |
| 74 | int __fscrypt_prepare_link(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir, |
| 75 | struct dentry *dentry) |
| 76 | { |
| 77 | if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry)) |
| 78 | return -ENOKEY; |
| 79 | /* |
| 80 | * We don't need to separately check that the directory inode's key is |
| 81 | * available, as it's implied by the dentry not being a no-key name. |
| 82 | */ |
| 83 | |
| 84 | if (!fscrypt_has_permitted_context(parent: dir, child: inode)) |
| 85 | return -EXDEV; |
| 86 | |
| 87 | return 0; |
| 88 | } |
| 89 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_link); |
| 90 | |
| 91 | int __fscrypt_prepare_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, |
| 92 | struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry, |
| 93 | unsigned int flags) |
| 94 | { |
| 95 | if (fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry: old_dentry) || |
| 96 | fscrypt_is_nokey_name(dentry: new_dentry)) |
| 97 | return -ENOKEY; |
| 98 | /* |
| 99 | * We don't need to separately check that the directory inodes' keys are |
| 100 | * available, as it's implied by the dentries not being no-key names. |
| 101 | */ |
| 102 | |
| 103 | if (old_dir != new_dir) { |
| 104 | if (IS_ENCRYPTED(new_dir) && |
| 105 | !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(parent: new_dir, |
| 106 | child: d_inode(dentry: old_dentry))) |
| 107 | return -EXDEV; |
| 108 | |
| 109 | if ((flags & RENAME_EXCHANGE) && |
| 110 | IS_ENCRYPTED(old_dir) && |
| 111 | !fscrypt_has_permitted_context(parent: old_dir, |
| 112 | child: d_inode(dentry: new_dentry))) |
| 113 | return -EXDEV; |
| 114 | } |
| 115 | return 0; |
| 116 | } |
| 117 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_rename); |
| 118 | |
| 119 | int __fscrypt_prepare_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, |
| 120 | struct fscrypt_name *fname) |
| 121 | { |
| 122 | int err = fscrypt_setup_filename(inode: dir, iname: &dentry->d_name, lookup: 1, fname); |
| 123 | |
| 124 | if (err && err != -ENOENT) |
| 125 | return err; |
| 126 | |
| 127 | fscrypt_prepare_dentry(dentry, is_nokey_name: fname->is_nokey_name); |
| 128 | |
| 129 | return err; |
| 130 | } |
| 131 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_lookup); |
| 132 | |
| 133 | /** |
| 134 | * fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial() - prepare lookup without filename setup |
| 135 | * @dir: the encrypted directory being searched |
| 136 | * @dentry: the dentry being looked up in @dir |
| 137 | * |
| 138 | * This function should be used by the ->lookup and ->atomic_open methods of |
| 139 | * filesystems that handle filename encryption and no-key name encoding |
| 140 | * themselves and thus can't use fscrypt_prepare_lookup(). Like |
| 141 | * fscrypt_prepare_lookup(), this will try to set up the directory's encryption |
| 142 | * key and will set DCACHE_NOKEY_NAME on the dentry if the key is unavailable. |
| 143 | * However, this function doesn't set up a struct fscrypt_name for the filename. |
| 144 | * |
| 145 | * Return: 0 on success; -errno on error. Note that the encryption key being |
| 146 | * unavailable is not considered an error. It is also not an error if |
| 147 | * the encryption policy is unsupported by this kernel; that is treated |
| 148 | * like the key being unavailable, so that files can still be deleted. |
| 149 | */ |
| 150 | int fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) |
| 151 | { |
| 152 | int err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode: dir, allow_unsupported: true); |
| 153 | bool is_nokey_name = (!err && !fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode: dir)); |
| 154 | |
| 155 | fscrypt_prepare_dentry(dentry, is_nokey_name); |
| 156 | |
| 157 | return err; |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_lookup_partial); |
| 160 | |
| 161 | int __fscrypt_prepare_readdir(struct inode *dir) |
| 162 | { |
| 163 | return fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode: dir, allow_unsupported: true); |
| 164 | } |
| 165 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_readdir); |
| 166 | |
| 167 | int __fscrypt_prepare_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) |
| 168 | { |
| 169 | if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) |
| 170 | return fscrypt_require_key(inode: d_inode(dentry)); |
| 171 | return 0; |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_prepare_setattr); |
| 174 | |
| 175 | /** |
| 176 | * fscrypt_prepare_setflags() - prepare to change flags with FS_IOC_SETFLAGS |
| 177 | * @inode: the inode on which flags are being changed |
| 178 | * @oldflags: the old flags |
| 179 | * @flags: the new flags |
| 180 | * |
| 181 | * The caller should be holding i_rwsem for write. |
| 182 | * |
| 183 | * Return: 0 on success; -errno if the flags change isn't allowed or if |
| 184 | * another error occurs. |
| 185 | */ |
| 186 | int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, |
| 187 | unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags) |
| 188 | { |
| 189 | struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci; |
| 190 | struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; |
| 191 | int err; |
| 192 | |
| 193 | /* |
| 194 | * When the CASEFOLD flag is set on an encrypted directory, we must |
| 195 | * derive the secret key needed for the dirhash. This is only possible |
| 196 | * if the directory uses a v2 encryption policy. |
| 197 | */ |
| 198 | if (IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && (flags & ~oldflags & FS_CASEFOLD_FL)) { |
| 199 | err = fscrypt_require_key(inode); |
| 200 | if (err) |
| 201 | return err; |
| 202 | ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode); |
| 203 | if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2) |
| 204 | return -EINVAL; |
| 205 | mk = ci->ci_master_key; |
| 206 | down_read(sem: &mk->mk_sem); |
| 207 | if (mk->mk_present) |
| 208 | fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk); |
| 209 | else |
| 210 | err = -ENOKEY; |
| 211 | up_read(sem: &mk->mk_sem); |
| 212 | return err; |
| 213 | } |
| 214 | return 0; |
| 215 | } |
| 216 | |
| 217 | /** |
| 218 | * fscrypt_prepare_symlink() - prepare to create a possibly-encrypted symlink |
| 219 | * @dir: directory in which the symlink is being created |
| 220 | * @target: plaintext symlink target |
| 221 | * @len: length of @target excluding null terminator |
| 222 | * @max_len: space the filesystem has available to store the symlink target |
| 223 | * @disk_link: (out) the on-disk symlink target being prepared |
| 224 | * |
| 225 | * This function computes the size the symlink target will require on-disk, |
| 226 | * stores it in @disk_link->len, and validates it against @max_len. An |
| 227 | * encrypted symlink may be longer than the original. |
| 228 | * |
| 229 | * Additionally, @disk_link->name is set to @target if the symlink will be |
| 230 | * unencrypted, but left NULL if the symlink will be encrypted. For encrypted |
| 231 | * symlinks, the filesystem must call fscrypt_encrypt_symlink() to create the |
| 232 | * on-disk target later. (The reason for the two-step process is that some |
| 233 | * filesystems need to know the size of the symlink target before creating the |
| 234 | * inode, e.g. to determine whether it will be a "fast" or "slow" symlink.) |
| 235 | * |
| 236 | * Return: 0 on success, -ENAMETOOLONG if the symlink target is too long, |
| 237 | * -ENOKEY if the encryption key is missing, or another -errno code if a problem |
| 238 | * occurred while setting up the encryption key. |
| 239 | */ |
| 240 | int fscrypt_prepare_symlink(struct inode *dir, const char *target, |
| 241 | unsigned int len, unsigned int max_len, |
| 242 | struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) |
| 243 | { |
| 244 | const union fscrypt_policy *policy; |
| 245 | |
| 246 | /* |
| 247 | * To calculate the size of the encrypted symlink target we need to know |
| 248 | * the amount of NUL padding, which is determined by the flags set in |
| 249 | * the encryption policy which will be inherited from the directory. |
| 250 | */ |
| 251 | policy = fscrypt_policy_to_inherit(dir); |
| 252 | if (policy == NULL) { |
| 253 | /* Not encrypted */ |
| 254 | disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)target; |
| 255 | disk_link->len = len + 1; |
| 256 | if (disk_link->len > max_len) |
| 257 | return -ENAMETOOLONG; |
| 258 | return 0; |
| 259 | } |
| 260 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: policy)) |
| 261 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: policy); |
| 262 | |
| 263 | /* |
| 264 | * Calculate the size of the encrypted symlink and verify it won't |
| 265 | * exceed max_len. Note that for historical reasons, encrypted symlink |
| 266 | * targets are prefixed with the ciphertext length, despite this |
| 267 | * actually being redundant with i_size. This decreases by 2 bytes the |
| 268 | * longest symlink target we can accept. |
| 269 | * |
| 270 | * We could recover 1 byte by not counting a null terminator, but |
| 271 | * counting it (even though it is meaningless for ciphertext) is simpler |
| 272 | * for now since filesystems will assume it is there and subtract it. |
| 273 | */ |
| 274 | if (!__fscrypt_fname_encrypted_size(policy, orig_len: len, |
| 275 | max_len: max_len - sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data) - 1, |
| 276 | encrypted_len_ret: &disk_link->len)) |
| 277 | return -ENAMETOOLONG; |
| 278 | disk_link->len += sizeof(struct fscrypt_symlink_data) + 1; |
| 279 | |
| 280 | disk_link->name = NULL; |
| 281 | return 0; |
| 282 | } |
| 283 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_symlink); |
| 284 | |
| 285 | int __fscrypt_encrypt_symlink(struct inode *inode, const char *target, |
| 286 | unsigned int len, struct fscrypt_str *disk_link) |
| 287 | { |
| 288 | int err; |
| 289 | struct qstr iname = QSTR_INIT(target, len); |
| 290 | struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd; |
| 291 | unsigned int ciphertext_len; |
| 292 | |
| 293 | /* |
| 294 | * fscrypt_prepare_new_inode() should have already set up the new |
| 295 | * symlink inode's encryption key. We don't wait until now to do it, |
| 296 | * since we may be in a filesystem transaction now. |
| 297 | */ |
| 298 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode))) |
| 299 | return -ENOKEY; |
| 300 | |
| 301 | if (disk_link->name) { |
| 302 | /* filesystem-provided buffer */ |
| 303 | sd = (struct fscrypt_symlink_data *)disk_link->name; |
| 304 | } else { |
| 305 | sd = kmalloc(disk_link->len, GFP_NOFS); |
| 306 | if (!sd) |
| 307 | return -ENOMEM; |
| 308 | } |
| 309 | ciphertext_len = disk_link->len - sizeof(*sd) - 1; |
| 310 | sd->len = cpu_to_le16(ciphertext_len); |
| 311 | |
| 312 | err = fscrypt_fname_encrypt(inode, iname: &iname, out: sd->encrypted_path, |
| 313 | olen: ciphertext_len); |
| 314 | if (err) |
| 315 | goto err_free_sd; |
| 316 | |
| 317 | /* |
| 318 | * Null-terminating the ciphertext doesn't make sense, but we still |
| 319 | * count the null terminator in the length, so we might as well |
| 320 | * initialize it just in case the filesystem writes it out. |
| 321 | */ |
| 322 | sd->encrypted_path[ciphertext_len] = '\0'; |
| 323 | |
| 324 | /* Cache the plaintext symlink target for later use by get_link() */ |
| 325 | err = -ENOMEM; |
| 326 | inode->i_link = kmemdup(target, len + 1, GFP_NOFS); |
| 327 | if (!inode->i_link) |
| 328 | goto err_free_sd; |
| 329 | |
| 330 | if (!disk_link->name) |
| 331 | disk_link->name = (unsigned char *)sd; |
| 332 | return 0; |
| 333 | |
| 334 | err_free_sd: |
| 335 | if (!disk_link->name) |
| 336 | kfree(objp: sd); |
| 337 | return err; |
| 338 | } |
| 339 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__fscrypt_encrypt_symlink); |
| 340 | |
| 341 | /** |
| 342 | * fscrypt_get_symlink() - get the target of an encrypted symlink |
| 343 | * @inode: the symlink inode |
| 344 | * @caddr: the on-disk contents of the symlink |
| 345 | * @max_size: size of @caddr buffer |
| 346 | * @done: if successful, will be set up to free the returned target if needed |
| 347 | * |
| 348 | * If the symlink's encryption key is available, we decrypt its target. |
| 349 | * Otherwise, we encode its target for presentation. |
| 350 | * |
| 351 | * This may sleep, so the filesystem must have dropped out of RCU mode already. |
| 352 | * |
| 353 | * Return: the presentable symlink target or an ERR_PTR() |
| 354 | */ |
| 355 | const char *fscrypt_get_symlink(struct inode *inode, const void *caddr, |
| 356 | unsigned int max_size, |
| 357 | struct delayed_call *done) |
| 358 | { |
| 359 | const struct fscrypt_symlink_data *sd; |
| 360 | struct fscrypt_str cstr, pstr; |
| 361 | bool has_key; |
| 362 | int err; |
| 363 | |
| 364 | /* This is for encrypted symlinks only */ |
| 365 | if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ENCRYPTED(inode))) |
| 366 | return ERR_PTR(error: -EINVAL); |
| 367 | |
| 368 | /* If the decrypted target is already cached, just return it. */ |
| 369 | pstr.name = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link); |
| 370 | if (pstr.name) |
| 371 | return pstr.name; |
| 372 | |
| 373 | /* |
| 374 | * Try to set up the symlink's encryption key, but we can continue |
| 375 | * regardless of whether the key is available or not. |
| 376 | */ |
| 377 | err = fscrypt_get_encryption_info(inode, allow_unsupported: false); |
| 378 | if (err) |
| 379 | return ERR_PTR(error: err); |
| 380 | has_key = fscrypt_has_encryption_key(inode); |
| 381 | |
| 382 | /* |
| 383 | * For historical reasons, encrypted symlink targets are prefixed with |
| 384 | * the ciphertext length, even though this is redundant with i_size. |
| 385 | */ |
| 386 | |
| 387 | if (max_size < sizeof(*sd) + 1) |
| 388 | return ERR_PTR(error: -EUCLEAN); |
| 389 | sd = caddr; |
| 390 | cstr.name = (unsigned char *)sd->encrypted_path; |
| 391 | cstr.len = le16_to_cpu(sd->len); |
| 392 | |
| 393 | if (cstr.len == 0) |
| 394 | return ERR_PTR(error: -EUCLEAN); |
| 395 | |
| 396 | if (cstr.len + sizeof(*sd) > max_size) |
| 397 | return ERR_PTR(error: -EUCLEAN); |
| 398 | |
| 399 | err = fscrypt_fname_alloc_buffer(max_encrypted_len: cstr.len, crypto_str: &pstr); |
| 400 | if (err) |
| 401 | return ERR_PTR(error: err); |
| 402 | |
| 403 | err = fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(inode, hash: 0, minor_hash: 0, iname: &cstr, oname: &pstr); |
| 404 | if (err) |
| 405 | goto err_kfree; |
| 406 | |
| 407 | err = -EUCLEAN; |
| 408 | if (pstr.name[0] == '\0') |
| 409 | goto err_kfree; |
| 410 | |
| 411 | pstr.name[pstr.len] = '\0'; |
| 412 | |
| 413 | /* |
| 414 | * Cache decrypted symlink targets in i_link for later use. Don't cache |
| 415 | * symlink targets encoded without the key, since those become outdated |
| 416 | * once the key is added. This pairs with the READ_ONCE() above and in |
| 417 | * the VFS path lookup code. |
| 418 | */ |
| 419 | if (!has_key || |
| 420 | cmpxchg_release(&inode->i_link, NULL, pstr.name) != NULL) |
| 421 | set_delayed_call(call: done, fn: kfree_link, arg: pstr.name); |
| 422 | |
| 423 | return pstr.name; |
| 424 | |
| 425 | err_kfree: |
| 426 | kfree(objp: pstr.name); |
| 427 | return ERR_PTR(error: err); |
| 428 | } |
| 429 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_get_symlink); |
| 430 | |
| 431 | /** |
| 432 | * fscrypt_symlink_getattr() - set the correct st_size for encrypted symlinks |
| 433 | * @path: the path for the encrypted symlink being queried |
| 434 | * @stat: the struct being filled with the symlink's attributes |
| 435 | * |
| 436 | * Override st_size of encrypted symlinks to be the length of the decrypted |
| 437 | * symlink target (or the no-key encoded symlink target, if the key is |
| 438 | * unavailable) rather than the length of the encrypted symlink target. This is |
| 439 | * necessary for st_size to match the symlink target that userspace actually |
| 440 | * sees. POSIX requires this, and some userspace programs depend on it. |
| 441 | * |
| 442 | * This requires reading the symlink target from disk if needed, setting up the |
| 443 | * inode's encryption key if possible, and then decrypting or encoding the |
| 444 | * symlink target. This makes lstat() more heavyweight than is normally the |
| 445 | * case. However, decrypted symlink targets will be cached in ->i_link, so |
| 446 | * usually the symlink won't have to be read and decrypted again later if/when |
| 447 | * it is actually followed, readlink() is called, or lstat() is called again. |
| 448 | * |
| 449 | * Return: 0 on success, -errno on failure |
| 450 | */ |
| 451 | int fscrypt_symlink_getattr(const struct path *path, struct kstat *stat) |
| 452 | { |
| 453 | struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; |
| 454 | struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); |
| 455 | const char *link; |
| 456 | DEFINE_DELAYED_CALL(done); |
| 457 | |
| 458 | /* |
| 459 | * To get the symlink target that userspace will see (whether it's the |
| 460 | * decrypted target or the no-key encoded target), we can just get it in |
| 461 | * the same way the VFS does during path resolution and readlink(). |
| 462 | */ |
| 463 | link = READ_ONCE(inode->i_link); |
| 464 | if (!link) { |
| 465 | link = inode->i_op->get_link(dentry, inode, &done); |
| 466 | if (IS_ERR(ptr: link)) |
| 467 | return PTR_ERR(ptr: link); |
| 468 | } |
| 469 | stat->size = strlen(link); |
| 470 | do_delayed_call(call: &done); |
| 471 | return 0; |
| 472 | } |
| 473 | EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_symlink_getattr); |
| 474 | |