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deps: upgrade openssl sources to openssl-3.5.7
PR-URL: #63820 Reviewed-By: Antoine du Hamel <duhamelantoine1995@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Richard Lau <richard.lau@ibm.com> Reviewed-By: Luigi Pinca <luigipinca@gmail.com> Reviewed-By: Filip Skokan <panva.ip@gmail.com>
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‎deps/openssl/openssl/CHANGES.md‎

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@@ -28,6 +28,303 @@ OpenSSL Releases
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OpenSSL 3.5
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-----------
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### Changes between 3.5.6 and 3.5.7 [9 Jun 2026]
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* Fixed heap use-after-free in `PKCS7_verify()`.
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Severity: High
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Issue summary: A specially crafted PKCS#7 or S/MIME signed message could
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trigger a use-after-free during PKCS#7 signature verification.
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Impact summary: A use-after-free may result in process crashes, heap
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corruption, or, potentially, remote code execution.
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Reported by: Thai Duong (Calif.io in collaboration with Claude
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and Anthropic Research).
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([CVE-2026-45447])
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*Igor Ustinov*
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* Fixed CMS `AuthEnvelopedData` processing may accept forged messages.
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Severity: Moderate
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Issue Summary: Cryptographic Message Services (CMS) processing fails
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to perform sufficient input validation on the cipher and tag length fields
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of `AuthEnvelopedData` containers, leading to various potential compromises.
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Impact Summary: Attackers making use of these vulnerabilities may achieve
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key-equivalent functionality for a given CMS recipient and/or bypass
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integrity validation for a given message.
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Reported by: Asim Viladi Oglu Manizada, Alex Gaynor (Anthropic),
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Ying Dong, and Haiyang Huang.
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([CVE-2026-34182])
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*Neil Horman*
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* Fixed unbounded memory growth in the QUIC `PATH_CHALLENGE` handler.
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Severity: Moderate
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Issue summary: Remote peer may exhaust heap memory of the QUIC server
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or client by flooding it with packets containing `PATH_CHALLENGE` frames.
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Impact summary: A malicious remote peer can cause an unbounded memory
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allocation which can lead to an abnormal termination of the application
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acting as a QUIC client or server and a Denial of Service.
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Reported by: Abhinav Agarwal.
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([CVE-2026-34183])
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*Abhinav Agarwal and Alexandr Nedvedicky*
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* Fixed NULL pointer dereference in QUIC server initial packet handling.
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Severity: Moderate
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Issue summary: Receiving a QUIC initial packet with an invalid token
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may trigger a NULL pointer dereference in the OpenSSL QUIC server
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with address validation disabled.
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Impact summary: NULL pointer dereference typically causes abnormal
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termination of the affected QUIC server process and a Denial of Service.
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Reported by: Sunwoo Lee (KENTECH), Hyuk Lim (KENTECH),
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and Seunghyun Yoon (KENTECH).
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([CVE-2026-42764])
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*Sunwoo Lee (KENTECH), Hyuk Lim (KENTECH), and Seunghyun Yoon (KENTECH)*
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* Fixed AES-OCB IV ignored on `EVP_Cipher()` path.
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Severity: Moderate
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Issue summary: When an application drives an AES-OCB context through
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the public `EVP_Cipher()` one-shot interface, the application-supplied
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initialisation vector (IV) is silently discarded.
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Impact summary: Every message encrypted under the same key uses the same
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effective nonce regardless of the IV supplied by the caller, resulting
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in `(key, nonce)` reuse and loss of confidentiality. If the same code path
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is used to compute the authentication tag, the tag depends only
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on the `(key, IV)` pair and not on the plaintext or ciphertext, allowing
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universal forgery of arbitrary ciphertext from a single captured message.
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Reported by: Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-45445])
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*Viktor Dukhovni*
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* Fixed possible heap buffer overflow in ASN.1 multibyte string conversion.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: A signed integer overflow when sizing the destination
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buffer for Unicode output in `ASN1_mbstring_ncopy()` can lead to a heap
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buffer overflow.
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Impact summary: A heap buffer overflow may lead to a crash or possibly
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attacker controlled code execution or other undefined behaviour.
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Reported by: Zehua Qiao and Jinwen He.
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([CVE-2026-7383])
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*Viktor Dukhovni*
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* Fixed out-of-bounds read in CMS password-based decryption.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: When CMS password-based decryption ([RFC 3211]/PWRI key
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unwrap) processes attacker-supplied CMS data, an attacker-chosen stream-mode
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KEK cipher can trigger a heap out-of-bounds read in `kek_unwrap_key()`.
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Impact summary: A heap buffer over-read may trigger a crash, which leads
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to Denial of Service for an application if the input buffer ends at a memory
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page boundary and the following page is unmapped. There is no information
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disclosure, as the over-read bytes are not revealed to the attacker.
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Reported by: Bhabani Sankar Das and Haruki Oyama (Waseda University).
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([CVE-2026-9076])
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*Nikola Pajkovský*
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* Fixed heap buffer over-read in ASN.1 content parsing.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: Parsing a crafted DER-encoded ASN.1 structure with a primitive
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element whose content exceeds 2 gigabytes in length may cause a heap buffer
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over-read on 64-bit Unix and Unix-like platforms.
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Impact summary: The heap buffer over-read may crash the application (Denial
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of Service) or to load into the decoded ASN.1 object contents of memory
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beyond the end of the input buffer. More typically, such ASN.1 elements
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would instead be truncated.
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Reported by: Frank Buss.
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([CVE-2026-34180])
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*Viktor Dukhovni*
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* Fixed PKCS#12 files with PBMAC1 are accepted with short HMAC keys.
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Severity: Low
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Issue Summary: The PKCS#12 file processing fails to perform sufficient input
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validation for files that use Password-Based Message Authentication Code 1
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(PBMAC1) integrity mechanism allowing a certificate and private key forgery.
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Impact Summary: An attacker impersonating a user can cause a service reading
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PKCS#12 files to accept forged certificates and private keys with a 1 in 256
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probability.
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Reported by: Pavol Žáčik (Red Hat) and Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-34181])
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*Alicja Kario (Red Hat)*
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* Fixed possible NULL dereference in password-dased CMS decryption.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: A specially crafted password-encrypted CMS message
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could trigger a NULL pointer dereference during CMS decryption.
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Impact summary: This NULL pointer dereference could lead to an application
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crash and a Denial of Service.
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Reported by: Mayank Jangid, Kushal Khemka, Hari Priandana,
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Bhabani Sankar Das, and Qifan Zhang (Palo Alto Networks).
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([CVE-2026-42766])
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*Igor Ustinov*
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* Fixed NULL pointer dereference in CRMF `EncryptedValue` decryption.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: An attacker-controlled CMP (Certificate Management Protocol)
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server could trigger a NULL pointer dereference in a CMP client application.
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Impact summary: A NULL pointer dereference could cause a crash
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of the application and a Denial of Service.
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Reported by: Zhanpeng Liu (Tencent Xuanwu Lab),
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Guannan Wang (Tencent Xuanwu Lab), and Guancheng Li (Tencent Xuanwu Lab).
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([CVE-2026-42767])
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*Igor Ustinov*
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* Fixed multi-`RecipientInfo` Bleichenbacher Oracle in `CMS_decrypt()`
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and `PKCS7_decrypt()`.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: The `CMS_decrypt()` and `PKCS7_decrypt()` functions
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are vulnerable to Bleichenbacher-style attack when an attacker is able
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to provide CMS or S/MIME messages and observe the error code
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and/or decryption output.
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Impact summary: The Bleichenbacher-style attack allows an attacker to use
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the victim's vulnerable application as a way to decrypt or sign messages
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with the victim's private RSA key.
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Reported by: Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-42768])
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*Dmitry Belyavskiy (Red Hat) and Alicja Kario (Red Hat)*
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* Fixed trust anchor substitution via `cert`/`issuer` typo in CMP
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`rootCaKeyUpdate`.
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Severity: Low
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Issue Summary: An error in the callback used to verify the certificate
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provided in a Root CA key update Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)
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message response rendered the certificate validation ineffectual,
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which could lead to escalation of credentials from the Registration
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Authority (RA) level to the root Certification Authority (root CA) level.
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Impact Summary: The Registration Authority could replace the root CA
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certificate for the CMP clients with an arbitrary root CA certificate.
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Reported by: Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-42769])
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*Alex Gaynor (Anthropic) and Bob Beck*
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* Fixed FFC-DH peer validation uses attacker-supplied `q`.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: When `EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer()` is called with a DHX (X9.42)
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peer key, the peer key is not properly checked for the subgroup membership.
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Impact summary: A malicious peer which presents an X9.42 key carrying
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the victim's `p` and `g` parameters, a forged `q = r` (a small prime factor
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of the cofactor `(p − 1)/q_local`), and a public value `Y` of order `r` can
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recover the victim's private key after a small number of key exchange
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attempts.
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Reported by: Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-42770])
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*Alex Gaynor (Anthropic), Viktor Dukhovni, and Norbert Pócs*
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* Fixed incorrect tag processing for empty messages in AES-GCM-SIV
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and AES-SIV modes.
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Severity: Low
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Issue summary: The implementations of AES-SIV ([RFC 5297]) and AES-GCM-SIV
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([RFC 8452]) mishandle the authentication of AAD (Additional Authenticated
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Data) with an empty ciphertext, allowing forgery of such messages.
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Impact summary: An attacker can forge empty messages with arbitrary AAD
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to the victim's application using these ciphers.
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Reported by: Alex Gaynor (Anthropic).
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([CVE-2026-45446])
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*Dmitry Belyavskiy (Red Hat)*
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* Fixed TLS 1.3 server not sending `NewSessionTicket` message
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after ciphersuite mismatch.
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<!-- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/30626 -->
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*Daniel Kubec*
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* Implemented validation of the minimal length of PSK identity
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being of at least one byte long, as required per [RFC 8446].
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<!-- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31058 -->
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*Matt Caswell*
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* Fixed usage of stale application buffer pointer by kTLS implementation
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after incomplete writes when `SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER` is set,
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that led to invalid memory reads and sending of incorrect data.
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<!-- https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/31146 -->
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*Ilya Maximets*
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### Changes between 3.5.5 and 3.5.6 [7 Apr 2026]
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* Fixed incorrect failure handling in RSA KEM RSASVE encapsulation.
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[CVE-2025-69420]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2025-69420
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[CVE-2025-69421]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2025-69421
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[CVE-2026-2673]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-2673
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[CVE-2026-7383]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-7383
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[CVE-2026-9076]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-9076
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[CVE-2026-22795]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-22795
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[CVE-2026-22796]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-22796
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[CVE-2026-28387]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-28387
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[CVE-2026-28390]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-28390
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[CVE-2026-31789]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-31789
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[CVE-2026-31790]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-31790
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[CVE-2026-34180]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34180
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[CVE-2026-34181]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34181
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[CVE-2026-34182]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34182
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[CVE-2026-34183]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-34183
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[CVE-2026-42764]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42764
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[CVE-2026-42766]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42766
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[CVE-2026-42767]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42767
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[CVE-2026-42768]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42768
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[CVE-2026-42769]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42769
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[CVE-2026-42770]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-42770
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[CVE-2026-45445]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-45445
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[CVE-2026-45446]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-45446
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[CVE-2026-45447]: https://openssl-library.org/news/vulnerabilities/#CVE-2026-45447
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[ESV]: https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/cryptographic-module-validation-program/entropy-validations
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[RFC 2578 (STD 58), section 3.5]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5
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[RFC 3211]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3211
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[RFC 5297]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5297
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[RFC 8446]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446
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[RFC 8452]: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8452

‎deps/openssl/openssl/Configurations/README.md‎

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Text::Template, using `{-` and `-}` as delimiters that enclose the
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perl code fragments that generate configuration-dependent content.
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Those perl fragments have access to all the hash variables from
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configdata.pem.
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configdata.pm.
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The build-file template is expected to define at least the following
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perl functions in a perl code fragment enclosed with `{-` and `-}`.

‎deps/openssl/openssl/Configure‎

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#! /usr/bin/env perl
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# -*- mode: perl; -*-
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# Copyright 2016-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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# Copyright 2016-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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#
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# Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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# this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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#
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# API compatibility name to version number mapping.
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#
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my $apitable = {
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# This table expresses when API additions or changes can occur.
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# The numbering used changes from 3.0 and on because we updated
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# (solidified) our version numbering scheme at that point.
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# From 3.0 and on, we internalise the given version number in decimal
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# as MAJOR * 10000 + MINOR * 100 + 0
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"3.0.0" => 30000,
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"3.0" => 30000,
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# This table expresses when API additions or changes can occur
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my $apitable = {
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"0.9.8" => 908,
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# From 3.0 and on, we internalise the given version number in decimal
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# as MAJOR * 10000 + MINOR * 100 + 0
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my @post30_versions = ([3, 0], [3, 1], [3, 2], [3, 3], [3, 4], [3, 5],
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);
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# The numbering used changes from 3.0 and on because we updated
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# (solidified) our version numbering scheme at that point.
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foreach (@post30_versions) {
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my ($x, $y) = @{$_};
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$apitable->{"$x.$y.0"} = $apitable->{"$x.$y"} = $x * 10000 + $y * 100;
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}
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# For OpenSSL::config::get_platform
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my %guess_opts = ();
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