"""Run-composition layer for the CLI's ``run`` callback.

``cli.cmd_run`` used to build the :class:`~bmad_loop.model.RunState`, wire the

:class:`~bmad_loop.engine.Engine`, and stand up the coding-CLI adapters inline in

an argparse callback — logic that could only be exercised by round-tripping

through argv. This module lifts those pieces out as typed functions so a non-CLI

frontend (or a test) can compose a run directly:

* :func:`make_adapters` — the per-role adapter factory.

* :func:`platform_preflight` — the multiplexer/process-host readiness probe

``cmd_validate`` reports.

* :func:`build_run_state` / :func:`compose_run` — the RunState + Engine wiring

for ``cmd_run``.

* :func:`compose_sweep` — the same wiring for a ``sweep`` run (``cmd_sweep`` and

the auto-triggered child-sweep factory).

* :func:`compose_resume` — rebuilds the engine for a paused/interrupted run

(``cmd_resume`` and ``resolve``'s re-arm), selecting the sweep/stories/plain

variant from persisted run state.

* :func:`config_digest` — the integrity pin over the agent-writable config that

reaches host code execution (issue #461 point 4).

The engine class and the adapter factory are *injected* into :func:`compose_run`

rather than referenced here directly: ``cli`` resolves ``Engine`` /

``StoriesEngine`` / ``_make_adapters`` from its own module namespace at call time,

so the test suite's ``monkeypatch.setattr(cli, "Engine", ...)`` (and friends)

still bites. ``cli`` re-exports :func:`make_adapters`, :func:`platform_preflight`,

:func:`mux_reason_label`, and :data:`ROLES` under their historical private names

so those seams stay importable and monkeypatchable from ``cli``.

"""

from __future__ import annotations

import hashlib

import json

import os

import stat

import sys

import time

from contextlib import suppress

from dataclasses import dataclass

from pathlib import Path

from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, Protocol

from . import bmadconfig

from . import policy as policy_mod

from . import runs

from .checks import Finding

from .journal import Journal, save_state, state_lock

from .model import RunState

from .platform_util import atomic_replace, is_link_like, is_wsl_unc_path

from .runs import RUNS_DIR

if TYPE_CHECKING:

from collections.abc import Callable

from .adapters.base import CodingCLIAdapter

from .adapters.profile import CLIProfile

from .engine import Engine, SweepFactory

from .policy import Policy

from .stories_engine import StoriesEngine

from .sweep import SweepEngine

class MakeAdapters(Protocol):

"""Call shape of :func:`make_adapters`, which ``compose_*`` takes injected.

Spelled as a Protocol rather than a ``Callable`` alias only so the

keyword-only ``profiles`` freeze below is part of the injected contract:

a frontend that supplies its own factory has to accept the pre-resolved

profiles, or silently re-read them from disk."""

def __call__(

self,

project: Path,

run_dir: Path,

policy: Policy,

*,

profiles: dict[str, CLIProfile] | None = None,

) -> dict[str, CodingCLIAdapter]: ...

# The three adapter roles a run wires. Defined here (the composition layer that

# actually builds them) and re-exported as ``cli.ROLES``, which `cmd_validate`

# and the test suite resolve.

ROLES = ("dev", "review", "triage")

SWEEP_OPTIONS_VERSION = 2

_MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES = 64 * 1024

def resolve_profiles(policy: Policy, project: Path) -> dict[str, CLIProfile]:

"""Resolve every role's :class:`CLIProfile` from disk **once**, as a mapping

the caller can then hand to both :func:`config_digest` and

:func:`make_adapters` so the two agree on the same bytes.

This exists for the child-sweep gate (#461 point 4). ``config_digest`` and

``make_adapters`` each used to call ``get_profile`` on their own, which made

the gate a check-then-use over two *separate* reads of an agent-writable

file: a session that leaves a background writer flipping

``.bmad-loop/profiles/*.toml`` between a benign and a hostile copy needs only

the digest's read to catch the benign one and the adapter's read to catch the

other. That race is cheap to repeat — a lost round raises

`sweep-auto-not-started`, which `_maybe_auto_sweep` swallows, so the parent

runs on and the next epic boundary deals a fresh hand — so "narrow window" is

not a defense. The repeat is the writer's, never the orchestrator's: #501

leaves a refused trigger unspent, but nothing re-asks that trigger (see

`_maybe_auto_sweep`'s docstring), and under ``[sweep] auto = "run-end"`` a run

has exactly one. It is `per-epic` that hands out the further rounds.

Resolving once and threading the result removes the second read rather than

shrinking the window.

``cmd_run`` and ``_resume_paused_run`` thread it too, for a DIFFERENT reason —

they stamp a baseline rather than compare against one, and at launch the

on-disk config is the trust anchor, so no race there grants an attacker

anything a plain pre-launch write does not. What the second read cost them was

accuracy: the pin they mint is what every later auto-sweep is held to, so a pin

over bytes the run did not launch makes those children refuse the config the

parent has been running all along. See ``cli._launch_profiles``.

The policy half needs no equivalent: ``cli._sweep_factory`` already loads

``policy.toml`` once and passes that one frozen ``Policy`` to both the gate

and the composition. Profiles were the only surface read twice.

Deduplicated by profile name, so the common single-CLI policy touches disk

once rather than three times. ``ProfileError`` propagates.

"""

from .adapters.profile import get_profile

by_name: dict[str, CLIProfile] = {}

for role in ROLES:

name = policy.adapter.resolved(role).name

if name not in by_name:

by_name[name] = get_profile(name, project)

return {role: by_name[policy.adapter.resolved(role).name] for role in ROLES}

def config_digest(

policy: Policy, project: Path, *, profiles: dict[str, CLIProfile] | None = None

) -> str:

"""sha256 over the agent-writable config that reaches **host** code execution.

The driven sessions can write anywhere under the project tree, including

``.bmad-loop/policy.toml`` and ``.bmad-loop/profiles/*.toml`` — so a session

can rewrite the commands ``verify`` runs (``shell=True``), the ``binary`` a

later session is launched from, or the ``[plugins] enabled`` allowlist that

gates in-process Python import (issue #461 point 4). A run freezes its

``Policy`` at launch, so the parent loop is already pinned; this digest exists

for the one path that re-reads config mid-run with **no human present** — the

auto-triggered child sweep in ``cli._sweep_factory``.

Field-scoped on purpose. A whole-file hash would also fire on the benign

``[limits]`` live-edits #189 documents as supported, so this covers exactly

the exec-reachable surface:

* ``verify.commands`` — order-preserved; they run in sequence.

* ``sorted(plugins.enabled)`` — set semantics, so order is not meaningful.

* per :data:`ROLES`, every field that decides **which program runs and with

what flags and environment**. That rule, not a hand-picked list, is what

keeps this complete: walk ``GenericAdapter.interactive_argv`` and

``interactive_env`` and every token there traces back to one of

``binary`` / ``launch_args`` / ``bypass_args`` / ``model_flag`` /

``prompt_template`` / ``env`` on the *resolved* profile, or to

``extra_args`` on the resolved adapter. The opencode-http builder reads a

strict SUBSET of those — ``_serve_argv`` takes ``binary`` and the adapter's

``extra_args`` and nothing else, and ``_session_env`` layers

``profile.env`` plus one *generated* variable, which the ``skill_tree``

bullet below accounts for. See the union paragraph on why the subset does

not narrow what is hashed.

* ``adapter`` — the field naming the adapter KIND, because it decides *which

argv builder runs at all*. ``make_adapters`` resolves it against the adapter

registry (``adapters/registry.py``), so rewriting it does not add a token: it

swaps the entire builder, and with it every rule the bullets above assume.

See the paragraph below on why a hard-coded token is not the same thing as a

safe one — that argument was written about ``hookless`` and transferred here

intact when the registry made ``adapter`` the selector.

* ``hookless`` — the transport. It no longer *selects* a builder, but it still

decides what the opencode builder emits, and it is what gates hook

registration; kept for the same wholesale-rewrite reason.

Three of those are easy to lose, and each was lost in an earlier cut of this

function — which is why the rule above is stated rather than the list.

``binary`` (and its siblings) live in ``profiles/*.toml`` and never appear in

``policy_snapshot``, so a snapshot-only compare is blind to them.

``adapter.extra_args`` *replaces* ``profile.bypass_args`` when set — it is the

field that carries ``--permission-mode bypassPermissions`` — so hashing the

profile default alone leaves the flags actually launched unpinned; ``None``

there means "fall back to the profile", a different state from ``()``, and the

two are kept apart. And ``prompt_template`` reads like prompt *payload* but is

not: ``interactive_argv`` places ``render_prompt(spec.prompt)`` in the argv

list, and the template need not contain ``{prompt}`` at all, so a rewritten

template is a verbatim attacker-chosen argv token. ``build_command``

``shlex.quote``\\ s it, which bounds it to ONE token — no word-splitting — but

one token is enough for the ``--opt=value`` form.

The builder selector was the fourth, and it was excluded here on a reading

that turned out to be wrong, so the correction is worth keeping — it is now

the argument for ``adapter``, since ``hookless`` selected the builder only

until the registry took that job over: *a hard-coded argv token is not the

same thing as a safe one.* Flipping ``hooks.dialect`` to ``"none"``

does not add a token — it swaps the whole builder, dropping ``launch_args``,

the prompt and the ``bypass_args`` fallback and putting the literal ``"serve"``

at argv[1], which ``_spawn_server`` then runs with ``cwd`` at the workspace

root. To a CLI that is a subcommand and a bad one dies in the health poll. To

an *interpreter* — a profile whose ``binary`` is ``python``/``sh``/``node``

with the real program in ``launch_args``, which nothing forbids — argv[1] is a

**script path resolved against the agent-writable tree**, and the exec happens

before the health poll it fails (three times: ``SPAWN_ATTEMPTS``). ``binary``

being pinned does not save it: the attacker inherits whichever binary the

project configured and only has to write a file named ``serve``. So the token

is a literal, and the argv is still attacker-controlled — walking the consumer

means asking what the *launched program* does with a token, not only where the

token came from.

The payload is the UNION of those fields across transports, not the subset

the role's builder actually reads, and that costs a known false positive:

``adapter.extra_args`` REPLACES ``bypass_args`` rather than extending it, so

for a role that sets it the hashed ``bypass_args`` is dead, and rewriting the

dead field alone moves this digest without moving one token of the launched

argv. Under ``hookless``, ``bypass_args`` / ``launch_args`` / ``model_flag``

are dead the same way. Hashing the effective projection instead means

restating two builders' precedence rules inside the control that polices

them, where drift is silent and lands in the UNDER-covering direction — the

failure this function has already made four times by reasoning from one

builder. Over-coverage fails the other way, loudly: ``sweep-auto-not-started``

+ notify, with the message naming ``bmad-loop sweep`` as the human-present

path. Not free — #501 stopped a refusal from *spending* the trigger, but that

is honest bookkeeping rather than a reprieve, since the same wrong answer

refuses the next trigger too. It needs a writer, though, and nothing under

``src/`` writes ``.bmad-loop/profiles/*.toml``

at all — that overlay is hand-authored, and the TUI settings screen writes

``policy.toml`` (``extra_args`` included). So a dead-field rewrite arriving

mid-run is a config change nobody automated made under a running loop, which

is the condition this gate reports rather than a false alarm to suppress.

That completeness rule — *walk the builder; every token traces back to a

hashed field* — is only available for a builder whose code is ours, and since

the adapter registry that is no longer guaranteed: an out-of-tree kind arrives

through the ``bmad_loop.adapters`` entry point, and its field reads cannot be

walked from here. What the rule becomes for such a kind:

* The reads are still drawn from a CLOSED set even though the builder is open.

An adapter is constructed from its kwargs and nothing else — the resolved

``CLIProfile``, the frozen ``Policy``, and the per-role ``extra_args`` /

``usage_grace_s`` / ``stop_without_result_nudges`` — so there is no field an

external builder can invent. But ``Policy`` is WIDER than the launch surface

hashed above: an external builder that read, say, a ``[limits]`` knob into an

argv token would be reading a field the exclusions below drop on the grounds

that *the bundled builders* cannot turn it into one. That reasoning is

builder-scoped, so for an external kind it does not carry.

* ``adapter`` being hashed bounds what that costs. A session cannot swap in an

unpinned builder mid-run — naming a different kind moves this digest. It can

only rewrite fields of the kind the run already launched under, and which of

those that kind reads was decided by that kind's own package.

So: derived for a bundled kind; for an external kind this pins the selector

plus the bundled launch surface, and the remainder is that package's own trust

boundary — the same boundary an enabled plugin's ``[python]`` module already

sits behind (see the plugin gaps at the end), not something a wider hash here

could close.

Deliberately EXCLUDED:

* The *bytes* behind ``binary``/``launch_args`` — this pins the launch

target's SPELLING, not its content. A project-local target (``binary`` a

path into the tree, or ``python`` with the program in ``launch_args``) can

be rewritten in place with no config field moving. The gap is real and

unguarded: ``profile.py`` requires only a non-empty ``binary`` string, while

the three sibling path fields (``hooks.config_path``, ``skill_tree``,

``seed_files``) all reject absolute and parent refs.

NOT excluded on "the parent execs it too" — that defence is false for the

``triage`` role. Base ``Engine`` wires only dev+review; ``sweep.py`` holds

the only ``adapters["triage"]`` assignment and the only two ``role="triage"``

dispatches, so a ``[adapter.triage]`` profile override's target is exec'd by

a sweep and by nothing else. ``sweep.auto = "run-end"`` and worktree

isolation give two more shapes where the child is the uniquely exposed one.

Excluded because a hash cannot identify the target. Which ``launch_args``

token names a file is undecidable (``-i`` vs ``tools/agent.py``);

digest-time resolution is not the tmux shell's; and one indirection defeats

it — this repo's own ``write_script_launcher`` is a stub that execs an

interpreter on a sidecar, so hashing the stub misses the payload. Nor is

the target ours to pin: it is normally a third-party CLI that self-updates,

and a mid-run update would move a content hash and refuse every auto-sweep

for the life of the run (the digest is pinned in memory at launch, so

nothing on disk can re-bless it).

Confinement is the instrument, not hashing — and as a ``validate`` warning

rather than a refusal, since "resolves inside the project" does not decide

it either: under an active project venv ``which("python")`` IS

``<project>/.venv/bin/python``, and this repo's own zero-token E2E gate

configures ``binary`` at ``<sandbox>/.bmad-loop/fake-cli.sh``. Tracked as

#500, to land with #499's fix option 3; unreachable on stock config (all six

shipped profiles are bare PATH names).

* ``hooks.config_path`` — the relay is issue #461's points 1-3, hardened on

its own track; folding it in would fire on an ordinary ``bmad-loop init``.

* ``adapter.model`` — it cannot introduce an argv token, only fill the value

slot behind ``model_flag``, which IS pinned here. Pinning it would refuse an

auto-sweep after a human's mid-run model change in the TUI.

* ``skill_tree`` — the one profile field reaching a launched session's env

without passing through argv. For a hookless role ``_config_content`` plants

``cwd/skill_tree`` in that ``OPENCODE_CONFIG_CONTENT`` as ``skills.paths``,

so a rewritten tree points the unattended child sweep at instructions of the

writer's choosing. Excluded because the pointer is not the door — the

content is, and the content is reachable with no config change at all, so

there is no digest to move either way. The triage session that consumes

``bmad-loop-sweep`` runs at ``workspace.root`` — the main checkout, never a

unit worktree, since ``sweep.py`` swaps the workspace only around bundle

execution — and a driven session can write that copy: worktrees mount under

``.bmad-loop/runs/`` INSIDE the main checkout, and nothing confines a

session's writes to its cwd (this docstring's opening premise). Nothing

hashes or reseeds a skill in place: ``_copy_skills`` skips an existing skill

dir absent ``--force-skills``.

Be precise about the worktree case, because the obvious reading is wrong:

under ``isolation = "worktree"`` a session editing the skill tree *in its

own worktree* does NOT reach that child. A gitignored tree is absent from a

fresh ``git worktree add`` checkout, so ``provision_worktree`` seeds it from

the WHEEL (``resources.files("bmad_loop.data")``) — the per-file no-clobber

that ``test_provision_worktree_does_not_clobber_existing_skill`` pins only

preserves a file the destination already has, which is the *tracked*

skill-tree case that test's own docstring names. The two copies then never

share bytes: the worktree-local exclude blocks staging and ``git merge``

moves only tracked content. The route above (absolute path into the main

checkout) is what carries this bullet, not in-worktree editing.

Skill-content integrity is a real question and not one a config hash can

answer.

* ``usage_parser`` — and with it the rest of the token-budget surface. It

selects a read-only tally over a transcript the orchestrator opens anyway

and decides no program, flag, or variable. Rewriting it to ``"none"`` DOES

make the mid-session guard inert (``tokens.read_usage`` returns None for

anything it does not recognize, so ``_sample_weighted_usage`` never trips

and the session drops out of accounting) — but the guard's own controls are

``limits.session_budget_mode`` / ``max_tokens_per_session`` /

``cache_read_weight``, which sit in the ``[limits]`` excluded above and

which the child sweep re-reads fresh from disk. ``session_budget_mode =

"off"`` silences the guard in one line and more completely (it never

samples at all), so pinning the parser bolts a side door in a wall whose

main door is held open on purpose. Admitting it also widens the rule from

the launch surface to the launch surface *plus safety knobs*, which is

``[limits]`` — the whole-file hash the second paragraph exists to reject.

* ``[plugins.<name>]`` settings — an enabled plugin's resolved settings do

reach exec (``bus.py`` exports each as ``BMAD_LOOP_SETTING_*`` into a

``shell=True`` hook, and the Unity plugin turns one into an ``--editor-path``

argv token), but the TUI settings screen writes those same tables, so

pinning them would refuse an auto-sweep after a supported human edit. They

are inside an *already-enabled* plugin's blast radius — the trust boundary

the gap below is about — rather than a way past the allowlist.

Known gaps, tracked separately (#496, #497). This pins the plugin allowlist by

NAME only, and the allowlist is not the whole plugin exec surface:

* A project-origin ``.bmad-loop/plugins/<name>/`` overrides a same-named

builtin (``plugins/loader.py`` overlay precedence) and

``trust.require_enabled`` gates on the name, so a session can swap the module

behind an *already* enabled plugin without moving this digest.

* Adding a plugin is caught only for one that declares ``[python]``. A

*declarative* manifest (no ``[python]``) loads on folder-drop by design

(``plugins/trust.py``) and ``registry.hooks_for`` hands its ``[hooks.<stage>]

cmd`` to the bus, which runs it with ``shell=True`` — with no ``enabled``

entry, and from a directory this digest never reads.

Closing either is a plugin-trust-model change rather than a wider hash, so

neither belongs here.

Tuples are normalized to lists before ``json.dumps(sort_keys=True)`` for the

same reason ``cli._resume_paused_run``'s ``policy_changed`` compare does it:

the live policy carries TUPLES where a persisted round-trip yields lists, and

a raw compare then reports "changed" every single time. ``ProfileError``

propagates — an unresolvable profile already aborts at :func:`make_adapters`.

``profiles`` is an already-resolved mapping from :func:`resolve_profiles`.

Pass it wherever the digest gates — or becomes the baseline for — something

that then *runs* under the same config, so the bytes hashed here are the bytes

launched rather than a second read of a file the sessions can rewrite in

between. Both halves of that rule have a caller: ``cli._sweep_factory`` gates,

``cmd_run``/``_resume_paused_run`` baseline. Omit it to resolve fresh, which

``cmd_sweep`` does deliberately — a human started that one, and the pin it

stamps gates no child."""

profiles = profiles if profiles is not None else resolve_profiles(policy, project)

launch: dict[str, dict[str, object]] = {}

for role in ROLES:

cfg = policy.adapter.resolved(role)

prof = profiles[role]

launch[role] = {

"binary": prof.binary,

"launch_args": list(prof.launch_args),

"bypass_args": list(prof.bypass_args),

"model_flag": prof.model_flag,

# An argv element, not prompt payload: render_prompt returns this

# template formatted, and it need not reference {prompt} at all.

"prompt_template": prof.prompt_template,

"env": dict(prof.env),

# THE builder selector: `make_adapters` resolves this against the

# adapter registry and the kind it names decides which argv builder

# runs at all. Rewriting it swaps the whole launch shape without

# moving one of the fields above.

"adapter": prof.adapter,

# The transport. It no longer selects the builder (`adapter` does),

# but it still rewrites what the opencode builder emits WHOLESALE

# rather than adding a token: hookless drops launch_args/prompt/

# bypass_args and substitutes `serve --port … --print-logs`, whose

# literal "serve" an interpreter binary reads as a cwd-relative

# script path.

"hookless": prof.hookless,

# None (inherit profile.bypass_args) is NOT the same state as () (an

# explicit override to no flags at all); json.dumps keeps them apart.

"extra_args": None if cfg.extra_args is None else list(cfg.extra_args),

}

payload = {

"verify_commands": list(policy.verify.commands),

"plugins_enabled": sorted(policy.plugins.enabled),

"profiles": launch,

}

return hashlib.sha256(json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True).encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()

def make_adapters(

project: Path,

run_dir: Path,

policy,

*,

profiles: dict[str, CLIProfile] | None = None,

) -> dict[str, CodingCLIAdapter]:

"""Build the per-role adapters. ``profiles`` is an already-resolved mapping

from :func:`resolve_profiles`; when given, no profile is re-read from disk, so

a caller that gated on :func:`config_digest` launches the *same* bytes it

validated (#461 point 4). Omitted, each role resolves fresh as before.

Also the single resolution point for this run's out-of-tree events directory

(#494), handed to every family it builds — see the ``events_dir`` note below."""

from .adapters.multiplexer import fold_version, get_multiplexer, mux_usable

from .adapters.profile import ProfileError, get_profile

from .adapters.registry import AdapterError, get_adapter_kind

# The dev skill (bmad-build-auto) writes no result.json: its adapter

# synthesizes the result from the spec, and so needs the project paths to

# find that spec — rebasing onto the active worktree's implementation-

# artifacts dir under isolation, not just the main checkout's.

paths = bmadconfig.load_paths(project)

mux = None

adapters: dict[str, CodingCLIAdapter] = {}

by_cfg: dict = {}

for role in ROLES:

cfg = policy.adapter.resolved(role)

# Both the dev and review sessions are now bmad-build-auto runs (the review

# session re-invokes the dev skill on the done spec for a follow-up pass),

# and the skill writes no result.json — its adapter synthesizes the result

# from the spec it leaves on disk, so it needs the project paths to find

# that spec and cannot be shared with the triage role even on identical

# config. `synthesizes` is a bmad-build-auto pipeline concept (which variant

# of a family to build + whether to thread `paths`), NOT a per-family

# branch — it stays a documented contract for every registered adapter.

# `policy.dev.skill` below is the stable adapter DISCRIMINATOR (see

# policy.DevPolicy), NOT the invoked name — it keeps the pre-rename spelling.

synthesizes = role in ("dev", "review") and policy.dev.skill == "bmad-dev-auto"

key = (cfg, synthesizes)

if key not in by_cfg:

if profiles is not None:

profile = profiles[role]

else:

try:

profile = get_profile(cfg.name, project)

except ProfileError as e:

raise SystemExit(f"error: {e}") from e

# Which adapter class drives this CLI is pure data — `profile.adapter`

# resolved against the registry. No adapter-name branching lives here;

# a new family plugs in with zero edits to this function. Note this

# reads the profile RESOLVED ABOVE, so under the `profiles is not None`

# path the kind comes from the same bytes `config_digest` pinned (#461

# point 4) rather than a second read of a file a session can rewrite in

# between. An unknown kind fails loud naming the profile.

try:

kind = get_adapter_kind(profile.adapter)

except AdapterError as e:

raise SystemExit(f"error: profile {profile.name!r}: {e}") from e

# The load thunk is where a family's classes — and any optional

# dependency they pull in — are first imported, and it is deliberately

# never invoked by `validate` or `bmad-loop adapters` (both stay free

# of heavy imports), so a thunk that raises has had no earlier gate.

# By here `compose_run` has already written the run state and pid. An

# escaping ImportError used to strand that run directory behind a

# traceback, recorded as an accepted consequence; it no longer does —

# both composers unwind the whole composition on any escape (see

# `_unwind_composition`), and this raise is one of the six SystemExits

# that path exists for. What that changes is the run dir, not the

# message: the narrowing below is a separate decision and still holds.

# ImportError ONLY, on the same rule as `construct_error` below: a

# missing dependency is a lazy loader's DECLARED failure, while

# anything else is a bug in that package and must surface as itself

# rather than as a misleading `error:` line. Widening this to

# `Exception` would contradict the pin two tests down.

try:

builder = kind.load()

except ImportError as e:

raise SystemExit(

f"error: profile {profile.name!r}: adapter kind "

f"{profile.adapter!r} failed to load: {type(e).__name__}: {e}"

) from e

# Annotated: the literal below would otherwise fix the value type to

# `Path | CLIProfile`, and the `needs_mux` arm adds a multiplexer.

common: dict[str, object] = dict(

run_dir=run_dir,

policy=policy,

profile=profile,

extra_args=cfg.extra_args,

usage_grace_s=cfg.usage_grace_s,

stop_without_result_nudges=cfg.stop_without_result_nudges,

# The run's out-of-tree hook-event channel (#494). Resolved HERE,

# from the `project` this function is handed, because it is the

# only layer that holds both halves of the key — the adapter sees

# a run dir and nothing else. Handed to every family rather than

# gated like `mux`: this is a description of the run, not a

# capability, and unlike resolving a multiplexer it costs no probe

# and can refuse no host. The engine derives the same value from

# the same two inputs for the producing side.

events_dir=runs.events_dir_for(project, run_dir.name),

)

if kind.needs_mux:

# Resolve and probe the shared multiplexer only when a kind

# actually drives one; a self-hosted HTTP/SSE family needs no

# transport (and a test asserts it is never even resolved).

if mux is None:

mux = get_multiplexer()

if not mux_usable(mux):

try:

version = fold_version(mux.version())

except Exception: # diagnosing must not mask the refusal

version = None

raise SystemExit(

f"error: multiplexer backend {type(mux).__name__} is not usable on "

f"this host (reported version: {version}); its transport binary is "

"missing, the version is unsupported, or a required helper is "

"absent (psmux needs `pwsh` on PATH); see `bmad-loop diagnose`"

)

common["mux"] = mux

# The synthesizing variant additionally needs `paths`; the plain

# variant does not accept it. `construct_error` is family-declared —

# `()` for a family that cannot fail construction (generic), or e.g.

# `(OpencodeServerError,)` for one that can — and becomes a SystemExit

# so a run aborts with a clean message instead of a traceback.

# `except ():` catches nothing, which is exactly right for the `()` case.

# A SIGNATURE mismatch is not a declared failure and no family names it,

# so it escaped both arms as a bare traceback until the second one below

# (#569): the bootstrap keyword set grows, and an out-of-tree class whose

# `__init__` does not accept a keyword this function passes is refused by

# the interpreter, not by the family. That arm keys on traceback DEPTH

# because depth is what separates the two TypeErrors — binding fails

# before any `__init__` frame is pushed, a raise from inside one carries

# that frame. ORDER MATTERS: a family that declares `TypeError` in its own

# `construct_error` keeps the `error: {e}` line above, unchanged.

cls = builder.dev if synthesizes else builder.plain

build_kwargs = {**common, "paths": paths} if synthesizes else common

try:

# heterogeneous **kwargs: pyright unions the dict values; per-arg error is spurious

by_cfg[key] = cls(**build_kwargs) # pyright: ignore[reportArgumentType]

except builder.construct_error as e:

raise SystemExit(f"error: {e}") from e

except TypeError as e:

# A binding failure is raised by the interpreter BEFORE any __init__

# frame is pushed, so the traceback holds this frame alone. A

# TypeError from inside a working __init__ carries that frame too and

# is a bug in that package: it must surface as itself, on the same

# rule the ImportError arm above states. Errs toward re-raising — a

# mismatch behind a Python-level metaclass `__call__` or a

# `super().__init__` call reads as deeper and re-raises, which is

# today's behavior; relabelling a real bug is the direction that would

# cost a diagnosis. Only valid while this `except` sits in the SAME

# FRAME as the call — do not extract the construct call into a helper

# or widen the `try`, either breaks it silently.

if e.__traceback__ is None or e.__traceback__.tb_next is not None:

raise

raise SystemExit(

f"error: profile {profile.name!r}: adapter kind "

f"{profile.adapter!r} rejected this run's adapter keywords: "

f"{type(e).__name__}: {e}"

) from e

adapters[role] = by_cfg[key]

return adapters

def mux_reason_label(reason: str) -> str:

"""Human wording for a MuxBackendInfo.reason, shared by `mux` and validate."""

return {

"env": "forced by BMAD_LOOP_MUX_BACKEND",

"policy": f"set by [mux] backend in {policy_mod.POLICY_FILE}",

"platform-default": f"platform default for {sys.platform}",

"first-match": "first available platform match",

# not "no registered backend is available": `_select` reaches `fallback` when no

# *available* backend matches this platform — an available backend registered for

# another platform leaves the reason here just the same.

"fallback": "fallback (no available backend matches this platform)",

}.get(reason, reason)

def platform_preflight(project: Path) -> list[Finding]:

"""Probe the platform-selected seams — the terminal multiplexer and the process

host — for `cmd_validate`, returning the findings in emission order.

A backend reports its own readiness through ``available()`` / ``version()``, so

a new OS or transport surfaces here by *registering* rather than by adding a

``sys.platform`` branch to validate. The process host is named so a

misselection (e.g. the Windows host picked on Linux) is visible at a glance.

``project`` is read only to name the host/interpreter mismatch behind #332 — a

win32 interpreter working on a WSL UNC path. Selection is unaffected by it: for

a win32 interpreter psmux *is* the right pick, so this warns rather than

re-chooses.

"""

from .adapters.multiplexer import (

detect_multiplexers,

external_backend_errors,

fold_version,

get_multiplexer,

)

from .process_host import get_process_host

found: list[Finding] = []

try:

backend = get_multiplexer()

label = type(backend).__name__

# Defensive fold: an out-of-tree backend can break the seam's

# single-line promise, and this string lands in an inline message.

version = fold_version(backend.version())

if backend.available():

found.append(

Finding(

"mux.backend",

"ok",

f"multiplexer {label} available" + (f" ({version})" if version else ""),

{"backend": label, "available": True, "version": version},

)

)

else:

found.append(

Finding(

"mux.backend",

"problem",

f"multiplexer {label} unavailable"

+ (f" (reports {version})" if version else "")

+ " — its transport binary is missing, the version is unsupported, or a "

"required helper is absent (psmux needs `pwsh` on PATH); "

"see `bmad-loop diagnose`",

{"backend": label, "available": False, "version": version},

)

)

except Exception as e: # selection or readiness must not abort validate

found.append(Finding("mux.preflight", "problem", f"multiplexer preflight failed: {e}"))

try:

infos = detect_multiplexers()

except Exception as e:

# Advisory, so it must not abort validate — but it must not be silent either.

# Two findings below read `infos`: `mux.selection` vanishes entirely, and the

# #332 warning degrades to its no-backend wording. Without this line the report

# shows a healthy `mux.backend` (independent, from `get_multiplexer`) above a

# warning naming no backend — which reads as "selection failed" when what

# actually failed was detection.

found.append(Finding("mux.backends-detected", "warning", f"mux detection failed: {e}"))

infos = []

if len(infos) > 1: # a lone tmux needs no listing; keep single-backend output stable

listed = ", ".join(

i.name

+ ("*" if i.selected else "")

+ (

" (available" + (f", {i.version}" if i.version else "") + ")"

if i.available

else " (unavailable)"

)

for i in infos

)

# The text flattens each row into a suffix soup ("tmux*, psmux

# (unavailable)") whose trailing `*` a consumer would have to parse to

# learn which backend is selected. The detail keeps the rows themselves.

found.append(

Finding(

"mux.backends-detected",

"ok",

f"mux backends: {listed} — `bmad-loop mux` for details",

{

"backends": [

{

"name": i.name,

"matches_platform": i.matches_platform,

"available": i.available,

"version": i.version,

"selected": i.selected,

"reason": i.reason,

}

for i in infos

]

},

)

)

chosen = next((i for i in infos if i.selected), None)

if chosen:

# Emitted for EVERY reason, not just the forced ones (#332): the reason that

# most needs naming is `platform-default`, which is how a win32 interpreter

# silently lands on psmux. detail keeps the raw enum, not mux_reason_label's

# prose: the label is wording ("set by [mux] backend in

# .bmad-loop/policy.toml"), the enum is the value MuxBackendInfo.reason

# actually carries.

#

# Severity follows the reason. `fallback` is the one `_select` returns when no

# *available* backend matches this platform, and its label says exactly that — so

# emitting it at "ok" would print a green line whose own text contradicts it.

# It stays a warning rather than a problem because `mux.backend` above already

# carries the problem for that host; this line only names how it got there.

found.append(

Finding(

"mux.selection",

"warning" if chosen.reason == "fallback" else "ok",

f"multiplexer selection {mux_reason_label(chosen.reason)}",

{"backend": chosen.name, "reason": chosen.reason},

)

)

# A warning, not a problem and not a note: an installed package the operator

# asked for did not load, which is a real failure — but selection already

# degraded past it (a failed external can never be the selected backend), so

# the preflight outcome above is authoritative and the verdict must not flip.

# `cmd_mux` has always printed this same condition as `warning:`; validate was

# the outlier, pinned to "ok" because promoting inserts " warning: " into the

# text (render() keeps the double prefix by design) and the TUI rendered that

# text verbatim. Since #210 the TUI reads `validate --json` and styles from the

# severity field, so the severity is free to say what the message already does.

for ep_name, reason in sorted(external_backend_errors().items()):

found.append(

Finding(

"mux.external-backend",

"warning",

f"external mux backend '{ep_name}' failed to load: {reason}",

{"entry_point": ep_name, "error": reason},

)

)

try:

host = type(get_process_host()).__name__

found.append(Finding("host.process", "ok", f"process host: {host}", {"host": host}))

except Exception as e: # a bad BMAD_LOOP_PROCESS_HOST must report, not crash

found.append(Finding("host.process", "problem", f"process host preflight failed: {e}"))

# A `warning`, never a `problem`: every seam above is healthy for this interpreter,

# so the verdict and the exit code must not flip — what is wrong is the interpreter,

# and only the operator can swap it.

if sys.platform == "win32" and is_wsl_unc_path(project):

# State only what the evidence supports: win32 + a distro path is NOT proof of a

# WSL shell — `cd \\wsl.localhost\...` from native PowerShell reaches the same

# condition, and the interop env markers do not survive the boundary (see

# `is_wsl_unc_path`) — so the WSL remedy stays conditional. The backend clause

# names what was *actually* chosen (a forced choice would otherwise contradict

# `mux.selection` above) and is dropped when selection failed (`chosen is None`):

# inventing a backend is the exact failure this check exists to stop.

picked = (

f"{chosen.name} was selected and the distro's own tmux is invisible to it"

if chosen

else "the distro's own tmux is invisible to it"

)

found.append(

Finding(

"host.win32-on-wsl-path",

"warning",

"the native-Windows build (this interpreter reports win32) is working on a "

f"WSL distro path — {picked}; if you are running from a WSL shell, install "

"bmad-loop with the WSL/Linux Python instead",

# `project` is deliberately NOT carried here: `validate --json` is not a

# sanitized surface, and a distro path ends in the *Linux* username,

# which the egress redactor does not know.

{"backend": chosen.name if chosen else None, "platform": sys.platform},

)

)

return found

def build_run_state(

*,

run_id: str,

project: Path,

repo_root: Path,

policy: Policy,

epic_filter: int | None,

story_filter: str | None,

max_stories: int | None,

stories_on: bool,

spec_folder: str,

trusted_config_digest: str,

) -> RunState:

"""Assemble the launch-time :class:`RunState` for a fresh run.

``policy_snapshot`` freezes ``policy`` at launch so every later display reads

the weights the run actually launched under; ``source`` / ``spec_folder``

record which queue the run dispatches (a stories manifest vs sprint-status).

``trusted_config_digest`` is carried here **as well as** stamped out of the

tree by :func:`compose_run` (#498). The out-of-tree file is the one resume

trusts; this copy is the secondary that travels with the run directory — see

``RunState.trusted_config_digest`` for why a run that outlives its state key

needs one.

``repo_root`` records the git root code work happens in (``paths.repo_root``),

which equals ``project`` unless the BMAD config sets a `repo_root:` override.

``runs.rearm_escalation`` runs out of process and reads it back to advance the

attempt baseline in the tree the proof-of-work gate actually measures."""

return RunState(

run_id=run_id,

project=str(project),

repo_root=str(repo_root),

started_at=time.strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"),

policy_snapshot=policy.to_dict(),

epic_filter=epic_filter,

story_filter=story_filter,

max_stories=max_stories,

source="stories" if stories_on else "sprint-status",

spec_folder=spec_folder if stories_on else "",

trusted_config_digest=trusted_config_digest,

)

@dataclass

class ComposedRun:

"""The composed-but-not-yet-run artifacts a ``compose_*`` returns for its

callback to render from — shared by :func:`compose_run`, :func:`compose_sweep`,

and :func:`compose_resume`.

``engine`` is ready to :meth:`run`; ``run_id`` names the run for the attach

hint. ``run_dir`` / ``state`` / ``journal`` are the persisted context a caller

other than the CLI can inspect."""

engine: Engine

run_id: str

run_dir: Path

state: RunState

journal: Journal

class SweepOptionsError(ValueError):

"""Persisted selector-bearing sweep options are unsafe to resume."""

@dataclass(frozen=True)

class SweepResumeOptions:

values: dict[str, Any]

only_ids: tuple[str, ...] | None

min_severity: str | None

digest: str | None = None

def load_sweep_resume_options(

run_dir: Path,

*,

required: bool = False,

expected_digest: str | None = None,

) -> SweepResumeOptions:

"""Load bounded, non-redirected sweep.json bytes and validate selectors."""

def corrupt(message: str, *, cause: BaseException | None = None) -> SweepResumeOptions:

# Runs from before the selector marker deliberately treated a missing or

# malformed options file as the legacy unrestricted shape. Keep that

# compatibility while current selector-capable runs fail closed.

if not required:

return SweepResumeOptions({}, None, None)

error = SweepOptionsError(message)

if cause is not None:

raise error from cause

raise error

opts_path = run_dir / "sweep.json"

if is_link_like(opts_path):

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json must not be a link-like path")

# Windows refuses opening a directory before fstat can classify it. Keep

# nonregular paths on the fail-closed boundary rather than misclassifying

# that open error as a tolerant legacy-file read failure.

if opts_path.exists() and not opts_path.is_file():

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json must be a regular file")

flags = os.O_RDONLY | getattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW", 0) | getattr(os, "O_NONBLOCK", 0)

flags |= getattr(os, "O_BINARY", 0)

try:

fd = os.open(opts_path, flags)

except FileNotFoundError:

if required:

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json is missing for this selector-capable run")

return SweepResumeOptions({}, None, None)

except OSError as exc:

return corrupt(f"sweep.json cannot be opened: {exc}", cause=exc)

try:

opened = os.fstat(fd)

if not stat.S_ISREG(opened.st_mode):

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json must be a regular file")

if opened.st_size > _MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES:

raise SweepOptionsError(f"sweep.json exceeds {_MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES} bytes")

chunks: list[bytes] = []

remaining = _MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES + 1

while remaining:

chunk = os.read(fd, min(8192, remaining))

if not chunk:

break

chunks.append(chunk)

remaining -= len(chunk)

except OSError as exc:

return corrupt(f"sweep.json cannot be read: {exc}", cause=exc)

finally:

os.close(fd)

data = b"".join(chunks)

if len(data) > _MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES:

raise SweepOptionsError(f"sweep.json exceeds {_MAX_SWEEP_OPTIONS_BYTES} bytes")

digest = hashlib.sha256(data).hexdigest()

if expected_digest is not None and digest != expected_digest:

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json no longer matches the options bound at launch")

try:

text = data.decode("utf-8")

except UnicodeDecodeError as exc:

return corrupt("sweep.json is not valid UTF-8", cause=exc)

try:

loaded = json.loads(text)

except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:

return corrupt("sweep.json is not valid JSON", cause=exc)

if not isinstance(loaded, dict):

return corrupt("sweep.json must contain a JSON object")

opts: dict[str, Any] = loaded

if required:

missing = [key for key in ("only", "min_severity") if key not in opts]

if missing:

raise SweepOptionsError(

"sweep.json is missing current selector field(s): " + ", ".join(missing)

)

raw_only = opts.get("only")

only_present = "only" in opts

only_valid = (

isinstance(raw_only, list)

and bool(raw_only)

and all(

isinstance(value, str)

and value.startswith("DW-")

and value.removeprefix("DW-").isdecimal()

for value in raw_only

)

)

if raw_only is None:

only_ids = None

elif only_valid:

assert isinstance(raw_only, list)

only_ids = tuple(dict.fromkeys(str(value) for value in raw_only))

else:

return corrupt("sweep.json has a malformed 'only' selector")

raw_min = opts.get("min_severity")

min_present = "min_severity" in opts

if raw_min is None:

min_severity = None

elif raw_min in ("low", "medium", "high", "critical"):

assert isinstance(raw_min, str)

min_severity = raw_min

else:

return corrupt("sweep.json has an invalid 'min_severity' selector")

if only_ids is not None and min_severity is not None:

return corrupt("sweep.json cannot contain both 'only' and 'min_severity'")

# Version-zero callers predate selectors and must never inherit selector-

# shaped keys from a stray or replaced options file. Current callers pass

# ``required=True`` and bind these exact bytes through RunState.

if not required or not only_present:

only_ids = None

if not required or not min_present:

min_severity = None

return SweepResumeOptions(opts, only_ids, min_severity, digest)

def validate_sweep_options_version(version: int) -> None:

"""Refuse state whose sweep options semantics this binary cannot interpret."""

if version not in (0, SWEEP_OPTIONS_VERSION):

raise SweepOptionsError(

f"unsupported sweep options version {version}; this binary supports legacy 0 "

f"or current {SWEEP_OPTIONS_VERSION}"

)

def validate_sweep_options_binding(

version: int, expected_digest: str, options: SweepResumeOptions

) -> None:

"""Bind current sweep options to the exact bytes published at launch."""

if version == SWEEP_OPTIONS_VERSION and options.digest != expected_digest:

raise SweepOptionsError("sweep.json no longer matches the options bound at launch")

def _claim_run_dir(run_dir: Path) -> os.stat_result:

"""Take exclusive ownership of a fresh run directory, refusing an id that

already names a run.

A **claim**, not a check, and that distinction is the whole point:

``exist_ok=False`` makes the directory's creation and the collision refusal one

atomic operation, so what follows may treat "this run dir is ours" as PROVEN

rather than inferred. :func:`_unwind_composition` deletes this directory

wholesale on a failed composition, and inference is not good enough to license

an ``rmtree``.

The hazard is not hypothetical. ``run_id`` is caller-supplied through the

hidden ``--run-id`` flag on both ``run`` and ``sweep``, and the composers ran

straight into ``Journal(run_dir)``, whose ``mkdir(parents=True,

exist_ok=True)`` adopts an existing directory without complaint. So pointing