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Security considerations section can be improved #3361
@aaronpk@pcarleton
The linked commit's direction makes sense to me: today the draft spec only requires HTTPS for authorization server endpoints, but bearer tokens are also sent to the MCP server itself, and Protected Resource Metadata tells the client which authorization server to trust. If either is served over plain HTTP, a network attacker can capture tokens or send the client to their own authorization server.
I'd propose this wording for docs/specification/draft/basic/authorization/security-considerations.mdx (Communication Security):
All authorization server endpoints, including authorization server metadata and client registration endpoints, MUST be served over HTTPS.
MCP server endpoints that accept access tokens, and their Protected Resource Metadata endpoints, MUST be served over HTTPS, unless the MCP server is only reachable on a loopback interface.
All redirect URIs MUST be either localhost or use HTTPS.
The loopback exception keeps local HTTP MCP servers compliant. It matches the existing localhost exception for redirect URIs and OAuth 2.1's loopback handling.
Would a PR with this change be welcome? Happy to open one.
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Babbar-rules commentedon Sep 24, 2026
@aaronpk @pcarleton
The linked commit's direction makes sense to me: today the draft spec only requires HTTPS for authorization server endpoints, but bearer tokens are also sent to the MCP server itself, and Protected Resource Metadata tells the client which authorization server to trust. If either is served over plain HTTP, a network attacker can capture tokens or send the client to their own authorization server.
I'd propose this wording for docs/specification/draft/basic/authorization/security-considerations.mdx (Communication Security):
The loopback exception keeps local HTTP MCP servers compliant. It matches the existing localhost exception for redirect URIs and OAuth 2.1's loopback handling.
Would a PR with this change be welcome? Happy to open one.