@jagmarques @tysoekong you are both landing on the same point independently and I think you are right. The separate-method approach was my original design because it keeps the policy document self-contained and portable. But the practical argument wins: if discovering permissions requires an extra round-trip, most clients will skip it. And for gateways aggregating dozens of servers, name-matching tools to an external ACL config is exactly the kind of thing that breaks the moment a new server is added dynamically.

The inline approach could work as optional fields on the tool definition in tools/list:

{
  "name": "push_files",
  "description": "Push files to a repository",
  "inputSchema": { ... },
  "permissions": {
    "scopes": ["repo:write"],
    "constraints": [
      { "type": "rateLimit", "max": 10, "windowSeconds": 3600 }
    ]
  }
}

Servers that do not include the permissions field default to unrestricted (backward compatible). Servers that do include it give clients and gateways something to enforce without a second call.

tysoekong's scopes/roles condition type is a good addition. The current spec handles parameter-level constraints but not caller-identity conditions. Adding a standard scopes field gives the agent early feedback that it lacks privilege, which is better than a blind denial after attempting the call.

I'll update the spec to support both modes: inline policy hints on tools/list for lightweight enforcement, and the full policy document for systems that need delegation chains, audit, and cross-server composition. The inline fields would be a subset of the full spec, not a separate schema.

The chain depth point is underrated. The most dangerous delegation chains we've seen in production are ones where each individual hop looks innocuous.

@aman210122 the derivation chain problem is real and it is the gap I have been avoiding because it is genuinely hard.

Your composition rules — max sensitivity, intersect access, union regulatory tags — are the right semantics. We saw a simpler version of this in multi-agent delegation chains: agent A has access to financial data, delegates to agent B with narrowed scope, agent B produces a summary that implicitly contains the restricted data. Our delegation protocol handles scope narrowing on the permission side but does not track what information is embedded in the output.

The healthcare scenario is the sharpest example. HIPAA + SOX derivation means the output inherits the most restrictive governance from all sources. If you only enforce at the tool call boundary, the output is unclassified despite containing classified inputs.

I think this belongs as a governance extension to the permission spec rather than in the core. The core handles pre-execution authorization (can you call this tool with these parameters). Output governance is a post-execution concern that requires tracking data lineage through the agent graph, which is a different problem with different enforcement points.

That said, the spec should define the hooks for it. An audit entry that records input source classifications alongside the tool call result would give a governance layer enough information to apply your composition rules after the fact.

Would like to see the formal definitions and test cases when you put them together. This is the kind of thing that needs concrete examples to get the semantics right.

Good point on the dual constraint set. The pre-execution permission check and post-execution composition check are distinct enforcement points that both need to exist.
Happy to contribute the composition semantics and test cases to the governance vocabulary crosswalk if that effort moves forward.

@arian-gogani @aman210122 the governance vocabulary crosswalk at aeoess/agent-governance-vocabulary#10 is exactly where the AgentsID permission spec should be mapped. The spec defines 12 constraint types and a delegation protocol — having those terms in a shared vocabulary alongside Nobulex's behavioral constraints and the composition semantics would make all three interoperable.

Please tag me on that issue when you are ready. I can contribute the AgentsID constraint type definitions and the evaluation algorithm semantics. The deny-first evaluation order, priority resolution, and scope narrowing rules are the pieces that need formal definitions if they are going to compose with other governance systems.

This conversation is converging on a layered architecture:

1. Permission layer — who can call what (AgentsID spec)
2. Behavioral constraint layer — how they can call it (Nobulex covenants)
3. Output governance layer — what rules apply to derived data (composition semantics)

All three enforcement points log to a shared audit trail. That is a complete governance stack for agent tool calls.

This layered framing makes sense. Permission (who can call what), behavioral constraints (how they can call it), and output governance (what rules apply to derived data) are three distinct enforcement points that all need to exist independently but compose together.
I will contribute the composition semantics formal definitions to the vocabulary crosswalk. The core rules are straightforward: under derivation, sensitivity takes max, access control intersects, regulatory tags union. The key design constraint is monotonicity: governance can become more restrictive through the derivation chain but never less restrictive without explicit human override.
Will follow up on aeoess/agent-governance-vocabulary#10.