Update docs/code-quality/c26832.md

Xazax-hun · dmitrykobets-msft · web-flow · commit 8ec8ffa05ab0 · 2023-03-08T09:06:02.000-08:00
Co-authored-by: dmitrykobets-msft &lt;89153909+dmitrykobets-msft@users.noreply.github.com&gt;
diff --git a/docs/code-quality/c26832.md b/docs/code-quality/c26832.md
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ void foo(unsigned short i, unsigned short j)
 
 In `i + j`, `i` and `j` are promoted to integers and the result of the addition is stored into a temporary integer. This integer is implicitly casted to `unsigned short` before the value is stored to `size`. The result of this cast might overflow. So, `SmallAlloc` might end up returning a buffer smaller than expected. Future accesses like `p[i]` are out of bounds. These code patterns can result in remote code execution vulnerabilities.
 
-Common allocation functions like `new`, `malloc`, and `VirtalAlloc` are recognized. The check also tries to recognize custom allocator functions by case insensitive search for the `alloc` substring in the function name.
+Common allocation functions like `new`, `malloc`, and `VirtualAlloc` are recognized. The check also tries to recognize custom allocator functions by case insensitive search for the `alloc` substring in the function name.
 
 Our analysis engine's numerical solver have some limitations reasoning about numerical overflows. As a result, this check is using some heuristics and sometimes fails to recognize that certain checks can prevent overflows.
 Usually, checking for a reasonable bound on the allocation should work. 
