| 1 | /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ |
| 2 | #ifndef _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H |
| 3 | #define _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H |
| 4 | |
| 5 | #include <asm/page_64_types.h> |
| 6 | |
| 7 | #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ |
| 8 | #include <asm/cpufeatures.h> |
| 9 | #include <asm/alternative.h> |
| 10 | |
| 11 | #include <linux/kmsan-checks.h> |
| 12 | #include <linux/mmdebug.h> |
| 13 | |
| 14 | /* duplicated to the one in bootmem.h */ |
| 15 | extern unsigned long max_pfn; |
| 16 | extern unsigned long phys_base; |
| 17 | |
| 18 | extern unsigned long page_offset_base; |
| 19 | extern unsigned long vmalloc_base; |
| 20 | extern unsigned long vmemmap_base; |
| 21 | extern unsigned long direct_map_physmem_end; |
| 22 | |
| 23 | static __always_inline unsigned long __phys_addr_nodebug(unsigned long x) |
| 24 | { |
| 25 | unsigned long y = x - __START_KERNEL_map; |
| 26 | |
| 27 | /* use the carry flag to determine if x was < __START_KERNEL_map */ |
| 28 | x = y + ((x > y) ? phys_base : (__START_KERNEL_map - PAGE_OFFSET)); |
| 29 | |
| 30 | return x; |
| 31 | } |
| 32 | |
| 33 | #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL |
| 34 | extern unsigned long __phys_addr(unsigned long); |
| 35 | #else |
| 36 | #define __phys_addr(x) __phys_addr_nodebug(x) |
| 37 | #endif |
| 38 | |
| 39 | static inline unsigned long __phys_addr_symbol(unsigned long x) |
| 40 | { |
| 41 | unsigned long y = x - __START_KERNEL_map; |
| 42 | |
| 43 | /* only check upper bounds since lower bounds will trigger carry */ |
| 44 | VIRTUAL_BUG_ON(y >= KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE); |
| 45 | |
| 46 | return y + phys_base; |
| 47 | } |
| 48 | |
| 49 | #define __phys_reloc_hide(x) (x) |
| 50 | |
| 51 | void clear_page_orig(void *page); |
| 52 | void clear_page_rep(void *page); |
| 53 | void clear_page_erms(void *page); |
| 54 | KCFI_REFERENCE(clear_page_orig); |
| 55 | KCFI_REFERENCE(clear_page_rep); |
| 56 | KCFI_REFERENCE(clear_page_erms); |
| 57 | |
| 58 | static inline void clear_page(void *page) |
| 59 | { |
| 60 | /* |
| 61 | * Clean up KMSAN metadata for the page being cleared. The assembly call |
| 62 | * below clobbers @page, so we perform unpoisoning before it. |
| 63 | */ |
| 64 | kmsan_unpoison_memory(address: page, PAGE_SIZE); |
| 65 | alternative_call_2(clear_page_orig, |
| 66 | clear_page_rep, X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD, |
| 67 | clear_page_erms, X86_FEATURE_ERMS, |
| 68 | "=D" (page), |
| 69 | "D" (page), |
| 70 | "cc" , "memory" , "rax" , "rcx" ); |
| 71 | } |
| 72 | |
| 73 | void copy_page(void *to, void *from); |
| 74 | KCFI_REFERENCE(copy_page); |
| 75 | |
| 76 | /* |
| 77 | * User space process size. This is the first address outside the user range. |
| 78 | * There are a few constraints that determine this: |
| 79 | * |
| 80 | * On Intel CPUs, if a SYSCALL instruction is at the highest canonical |
| 81 | * address, then that syscall will enter the kernel with a |
| 82 | * non-canonical return address, and SYSRET will explode dangerously. |
| 83 | * We avoid this particular problem by preventing anything |
| 84 | * from being mapped at the maximum canonical address. |
| 85 | * |
| 86 | * On AMD CPUs in the Ryzen family, there's a nasty bug in which the |
| 87 | * CPUs malfunction if they execute code from the highest canonical page. |
| 88 | * They'll speculate right off the end of the canonical space, and |
| 89 | * bad things happen. This is worked around in the same way as the |
| 90 | * Intel problem. |
| 91 | * |
| 92 | * With page table isolation enabled, we map the LDT in ... [stay tuned] |
| 93 | */ |
| 94 | static __always_inline unsigned long task_size_max(void) |
| 95 | { |
| 96 | unsigned long ret; |
| 97 | |
| 98 | alternative_io("movq %[small],%0" ,"movq %[large],%0" , |
| 99 | X86_FEATURE_LA57, |
| 100 | "=r" (ret), |
| 101 | [small] "i" ((1ul << 47)-PAGE_SIZE), |
| 102 | [large] "i" ((1ul << 56)-PAGE_SIZE)); |
| 103 | |
| 104 | return ret; |
| 105 | } |
| 106 | |
| 107 | #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ |
| 108 | |
| 109 | #ifdef CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION |
| 110 | # define __HAVE_ARCH_GATE_AREA 1 |
| 111 | #endif |
| 112 | |
| 113 | #endif /* _ASM_X86_PAGE_64_H */ |
| 114 | |